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ABSTRACT
May courts consider campaign communications when screening for bad motives? More specifically, if a government
official embraced constitutionally problematic reasons for acting when that official was campaigning for office, may
courts rely on that fact when asking whether illicit or suspect purposes animate that official’s post-election actions?
The question recently arose during litigation concerning President Donald Trump’s “travel ban,” with different
judges voicing different views on whether then-candidate Trump’s expressions of religious animus should factor into
an analysis of the travel ban’s underlying purpose (and, by extension, its ultimate constitutionality). Some of those
judges argued that the statements should carry no weight precisely because they were uttered during a campaign, thus
suggesting that campaign communications should be categorically excluded from motive-related inquiries. This
Article, by contrast, makes the case for an “inclusionary approach,” which would treat campaign communications
as potentially useful evidence to be considered alongside other indicators of illicit motive. This Article defends this
approach as generally consistent with the role that motive analysis plays within constitutional law and as beneficial
to the accurate judicial assessment of the government’s reasons for acting. This Article also considers and
acknowledges potential downsides to the approach, but it ultimately concludes that such downsides—though real—
are not sufficiently serious as to warrant a categorical rule of exclusion.
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INTRODUCTION
The path to power often runs through a political campaign. At the
federal, state, and local levels, individuals wishing to acquire or retain office
must frequently make their case to the voters, explaining why they deserve
election to the position being sought. Candidates devote significant resources
towards these efforts—speechifying, rallying, interviewing, advertising,
tweeting, and doing any number of other things to have their message heard.
And through these efforts, candidates create public records of positions,
promises, narratives, arguments, and rationales concerning their plans for
exercising the power they seek. Some elections are noisier than others—
county coroner competitions tend not to generate as much buzz as the
quadrennial race for the U.S. Presidency—but they all involve the same basic
dynamic: candidates campaign by transmitting information to voters about
what they intend to do and why they intend to do it.
Campaigns eventually conclude, but their records remain. And those
records might subsequently be of interest to constitutional claimants
challenging actions that victorious candidates go on to pursue. This is
especially so when a challenge centers on the question of government motive—
i.e., the reason why a government official or institution has chosen to pursue
the action under review. Whether the relevant concern is discriminatory
intent and the Equal Protection Clause,1 sectarian purposes and the religion
clauses,2 protectionist objectives and the Dormant Commerce Clause,3
1
2

3

See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (“Proof of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”).
See, e.g., McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“When the government acts with the
ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause
value of official religious neutrality . . . .”); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) (noting, in reference to the Free Exercise Clause, that “if the object of a law
is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral, and
it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest”
(internal citation omitted) (citing Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990)).
See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 n.15 (“A court may find that a state
law constitutes ‘economic protectionism’ on proof either of discriminatory effect or of
discriminatory purpose.” (internal citations omitted) (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
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punitive aims and the Ex Post Facto Clause,4 or other “suspect” motives
under other constitutional provisions,5 reviewing courts regularly consider
not just the substance and effects of challenged government action, but also
the motivating factors underlying its implementation.6 And where the
doctrine commands attention to the government’s reasons for acting, a past
record of campaign communications might potentially shed light on what
those reasons were.
Let us now pause to acknowledge the elephant in the room: Litigants
recently pointed to numerous statements of then-candidate Donald Trump
in arguing that various iterations of now-President Trump’s travel ban

4

5

6

617, 624 (1978); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352–53 (1977)); cf.
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352–53 (highlighting the possibility of an “economic protection motive” in the
course of striking down a law under the dormant Commerce Clause).
See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 613–14 (1960) (“In determining whether legislation
which bases a disqualification on the happening of certain past event imposes a punishment, the
Court has sought to discern the objects on which the enactment in question was focused.”); see also
Alice Ristroph, State Intentions and the Law of Punishment, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1353, 1356–
57 (2008) (highlighting a variety of ways in which “[s]tate intentions are relevant to the
constitutional law of punishment”).
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality opinion) (“A
finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose
or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus.” (emphasis added)); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (noting that
“[t]he government’s purpose is the controlling consideration” when it comes to evaluating a law’s
content-neutrality under the Free Speech Clause); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
534 (1973) (“[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it
must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”). For more detailed descriptive overviews of
the myriad doctrinal contexts in which motives analysis plays a part, see, for example, Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 312–18 (1997); Dan T.
Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch
Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1607 (2001); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden
Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523, 537–53 (2016). See also Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of
Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1793 (2008) (noting that “modern courts stand ready to
enforce a broad variety of purpose-based restrictions on legislative power by examining the
available legislative history and even by taking testimony about the legislature’s deliberations”).
The pattern, to be sure, is by no means uniform. Some of the Court’s decisions purport to disfavor
reliance on government motive. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (“It is
a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise
constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.”). But see Elena Kagan,
Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 413, 414 (1996) (contending that “notwithstanding the Court’s protestations in O’Brien . . .
First Amendment law . . . has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of improper
governmental motives”). And some of its doctrinal frameworks prohibit such inquiries altogether.
See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”). But cf. Cynthia Barmore, Authoritarian
Pretext and the Fourth Amendment, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 273, 295–98 (2016) (highlighting areas
of Fourth Amendment doctrine in which “the Court has recognized that the purpose behind
enforcement is relevant to the Fourth Amendment question”).
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reflected an intentional effort to discriminate on the basis of religion.7 As a
candidate, Trump frequently gave voice to anti-Muslim sentiments,8
endorsing, among other things, a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims
entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out
what is going on.”9 Some lower court judges pointed to such statements in
support of the conclusion that both prior and current versions of travel ban—
though facially neutral with respect to religion—furthered the religiously
discriminatory agenda that the Trump campaign openly embraced.10 But
other judges paid the statements no heed, insisting that any motive-based
inquiry must exclude campaign-related evidence from its purview.11 The
travel-ban litigation thus presented one iteration of the question whether
campaign communications ought to matter when it comes to gauging
government motive: When asking whether the travel ban furthered a suspect
or illicit government motive, should courts have been permitted to reach
back into the record of Trump’s inflammatory campaign?12
7

8

9
10

11

12

The initial travel ban was promulgated just one week into the Trump presidency. See Exec. Order
No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). But the President subsequently issued a revised
travel-ban, Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017), in response to an adverse
judicial holding from the Ninth Circuit. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1169 (9th Cir.
2017). Multiple lower courts then preliminarily enjoined that ban as well, but the Supreme Court
partially lifted the injunctions, thus allowing the second travel ban to expire by its own terms. See
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017). A third, and this time
permanent, travel ban was thereupon issued. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161,
45,161–62 (Sept. 24, 2017). That ban, too, was preliminarily enjoined in the lower courts, State v.
Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1160 (D. Haw. 2017), aff’d in part, No. 17–17168, 2017 WL 5343014
(9th Cir. Nov. 13, 2017), but the Supreme Court subsequently stayed the preliminary injunction
and eventually reversed the lower court judgment. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
For a useful run-down of both pre-campaign and post-campaign remarks, see Jenna Johnson &
Abigail Hauslohner, ‘I Think Islam Hates Us’: A Timeline of Trump’s Comments About Islam and Muslims,
WASH. POST (May 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/
2017/05/20/i-think-islam-hates-us-a-timeline-of-trumps-comments-about-islam-and-muslims/
?utm_term=.e7b0a8ebadbb.
See Russ Kick, Trump’s Deleted “Preventing Muslim Immigration” Statement, MEMORY HOLE 2 (May 10,
2017), http://thememoryhole2.org/blog/trump-muslim-immigration.
See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d at 1167; Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d
554, 594–96 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated in part, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project
v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 585–87 (D. Md. 2017), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018); Aziz v.
Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724, 737 (E.D. Va. 2017).
See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1173 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (characterizing an
inclusionary approach to campaign communications as “folly” and a “path [that] is strewn with
danger”); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d at 649 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the inclusionary approach as “fraught with danger and impracticability” and
“completely strange to judicial analysis”).
As readers well know, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the plaintiffs could not show a
likelihood of success on the merits with respect to their claim that the “travel ban” was
unconstitutional, opting to disregarded the voluminous record (both pre-and post-campaign) of the
religiously discriminatory reasoning that Trump and other advocates embraced. Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. at 2423. In so doing, however, the Court made no attempt to distinguish between
campaign communications and subsequent communications uttered by Trump in his official
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This Article develops a framework for thinking through both that specific
question and the more general relationship between campaign
communications and government motives across a range of different doctrinal
contexts.13 In particular, the Article endorses what I call an “inclusionary

13

capacity. As the Court saw it, the travel-ban, as “a national security directive regulating the entry
of aliens abroad,” was entitled to a highly (and perhaps even absolutely) deferential form of judicial
review, under which all evidence of improper motive must yield to even the most tendentious set of
post-hoc rationalizations. Id. at 2418; see also id. at 2420–21 (“[B]ecause there is persuasive evidence
that the entry suspension has a legitimate grounding in national security concerns, quite apart from
any religious hostility, we must accept that independent justification.”). This was, in my view, an
unpersuasive opinion with unsettling implications for future exercises of executive power. But what
is more relevant for our purposes here is simply that the opinion did not ultimately address the
question with which this Article grapples: the Court did not say one way or the other whether
campaign-based communications carried any probative value with respect to motives-based
constitutional review. Nor for that matter did the opinion render that question moot, given that
there remain many other areas of doctrine in which the presence or absence of government motive
still matters.
Most of the existing commentary on this issue stemmed from the travel ban litigation, which
spawned a number of blog posts concerning the constitutional relevance of then-candidate Trump’s
statements about his proposed “Muslim ban.” See, e.g., Vikram David Amar & Alan E. Brownstein,
The Complexities of a “Motive” Analysis in Challenging President Trump’s Executive Order Regarding Entry to the
United States, VERDICT: JUSTIA (Mar. 24, 2017), https://verdict.justia.com/2017/03/24/
complexities-motive-analysis-challenging-president-trumps-executive-order-regarding-entryunited-states; Richard Hasen, Does the First Amendment Protect Trump’s Travel Ban?, SLATE (Mar. 20,
2017, 9:28 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/03/
the_9th_circuit_s_alex_kozinski_defends_trump_s_travel_ban_on_first_amendment.html; Dawn
Johnsen, Judicial Deference to President Trump, TAKE CARE (May 8, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/
blog/judicial-deference-to-president-trump; Heidi Kitrosser, Is Speech from the Campaign Trail Relevant
to Religious Discrimination Claims?, ACSBLOG (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/
should-elected-officials-be-held-accountable-in-court-for-campaign-speech
[https://perma.cc/
DA3U-6KYG]; Eugene Kontorovich, The 9th Circuit’s Dangerous and Unprecedented Use of Campaign
Statements to Block Presidential Policy, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 9, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/02/09/the-9th-circuitsdangerous-and-unprecedented-use-of-campaign-statements-to-block-presidential-policy/;
Matthew Segal, President Trump’s Campaign Promises Stick with Us—They Should Stick with Him, Too,
JUST SECURITY (Mar. 25, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/39246/president-trumpscampaign-promises-stick-us-they-stick-him; Ilya Somin, Thoughts on the Appellate Court Ruling Against
Trump’s Immigration Order, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 10, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/02/10/thoughts-on-theappellate-court-ruling-against-trumps-refugee-order/?utm_term=.871065525996. The question
has thus far attracted only limited attention within the legal literature. The issue has also received
some treatment in several recent articles dealing with motives-based analysis more generally. See,
e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 547–60, 571–78 (2018); Aziz Z. Huq,
Judging Discriminatory Intent, 103 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 45–47) (on file
with author); Katherine Shaw, Speech, Intent, and the President, 104 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
2018) (manuscript at 39–41) (on file with author).
The most comprehensive work on the subject to date of which I am aware comes from
Professor Shawn Fields, who has offered a deeply informed analysis of the role that campaign
communications should play for purposes of establishing “discriminatory intent” under the
doctrinal principles under the Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses. Shawn E. Fields, Is It
Bad Law to Believe a Politician? Campaign Speech and Discriminatory Intent, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 273, 273–
74 (2018). Although Professor Fields and I arrive at similar conclusions regarding the
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approach” to campaign communications as an indicator of government
motive, contending that judges ought not be stopped from considering the
former when gauging the latter. As applied to Trump and the travel ban, for
instance, my prescribed approach would suggest that the evidentiary record
should have included both those post-campaign statements about the ban that
Trump made in his “official” capacity and any campaign-related statements
that shed further light on the ban’s underlying purpose. I further suggest,
subject to certain caveats outlined below, that the same approach should
apply across the many doctrinal areas in which government motives can affect
a law’s constitutional validity. To be clear, I make no specific claims about
the weight that campaign communications ought to carry relative to postcampaign statements and other “official” indicators of government motive,
and I acknowledge the possibility that post-campaign changes of course might
sometimes suffice to overcome any adverse motive-based inferences that preelection statements would on their own support. But I do maintain that
campaign statements should at least count for something when it comes to
identifying the government’s reasons for acting.
I develop the argument in three stages. In Part I, I identify the reasons
why motives might matter within constitutional doctrine. Drawing on the
voluminous prior literature on motives-based analysis in constitutional law, I
suggest that “badly motivated” government action might qualify as
constitutionally “worse” than innocently motivated government action
because bad motivations: (1) create or contribute to “expressive” or
“stigmatic” harms that are suffered by the public at large;14 (2) increase the
likelihood that government actions will generate other sorts of
constitutionally undesirable outcomes;15 (3) undermine the plausibility of any
regulatory justifications the government has adduced on a law’s behalf;16 and
(4) are themselves violative of a fixed and independent “rule” or “principle”

14
15
16

appropriateness of the inclusionary approach, we do so through analyses that differ in both
methodological focus and substantive scope. In particular, whereas Professor Fields situates many
of his claims within operative doctrinal principles of First and Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, see,
for example, id. at 315–24, my analysis operates a somewhat more abstract level. As I explain
further below, I am less interested in the question of whether campaign-cognizant motive review is
currently permitted by operative Supreme Court doctrine as I am in the question of whether, as a
theoretical matter, it ought to be so permitted. Second, and relatedly, I attempt here to paint with a
broader brush—considering the evidentiary value of campaign communications not just within the
particularized doctrinal context presented by the travel ban litigation, but also across all doctrinal
contexts in which a particular type of motive has been proscribed or disfavored. In this respect, I
believe the somewhat broader and more theoretical claims presented in this Article might usefully
supplement the more targeted and doctrinally-grounded claims advanced in Professor Fields’s rich
and illuminating work.
See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section I.B.
See infra Section I.C.
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associated with a given constitutional norm.17 In developing this taxonomy,
my aim is not to so much to defend the wide reach of motives-analysis within
operative constitutional doctrine, but rather to sort through the different
“types” of motives that courts might have good reason to care about.
Specifically, I conclude that the first “expressivist” rationale for motives
review favors an inquiry into the objectively apparent reasons for a law’s
enactment, whereas both the “effects-based” and “justifications-based”
rationales favor an inquiry into the subjectively embraced reasons for a law’s
enactment.18 The final, “rule-based” rationale, I concede, opens the door to
a hodge-podge of other more possibilities.
Part II then turns to the relationship between government motives and
statements from a campaign. Specifically, this Part defends the evidentiary
value of campaign communications, contesting in particular the claim that
statements by a mere candidate for office are irrelevant to the motives
underlying official governmental action. I argue in particular that campaign
communications can usefully inform inquiries into both apparent motive (by
supporting inferences about the public’s own perceptions of a former
candidate’s official actions),19 and actual motive (by offering a form of firstperson reporting as to the state of government official’s own values, opinions,
and beliefs at an earlier point in time).20 I also consider and reject the thesis
that—insofar as the doctrine centers on “official” as opposed to “unofficial”
motives for government action—campaign communications are inherently
off-limits.21 Such communications may qualify as “unofficial” in the sense
that they do not themselves effectuate government policy, but that hardly
prevents them from informing subsequent assessments of why official action
was taken. Thus, regardless of the “type” of motive being sought, campaign
communications will often carry meaningful evidentiary significance.
But arguments about evidentiary value do not alone establish the
desirability of the inclusionary approach; we must further consider potential
adverse consequences that might follow from its use. Part III considers three
such consequences: first, the inclusionary approach might chill candidates’
speech during a campaign;22 second, the inclusionary approach might
preclude desirable (or even necessary) government action after a campaign;23
17
18

19
20
21
22
23

See infra Section I.D.
This is consistent with Richard Fallon’s observation that a “variety of subjective and objective
conceptions of forbidden legislative intent make appearances in constitutional doctrine.” Fallon,
supra note 5, at 553; see also id. at 537–53 (charting different types of inquiries into legislative motive
across different areas of doctrine).
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
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and third, the inclusionary approach might frustrate judicial efforts to
achieve simplicity and predictability within constitutional doctrine.24 These
concerns are real, but they are in my view insufficiently compelling to
warrant an absolute bar on campaign-cognizant motives review. There
remains, after all, the very real benefit to be gained from the inclusionary
approach—namely, that of incorporating relevant information within the
constitutional record—and that benefit will sometimes outweigh whatever
adverse effects the inclusionary approach might yield. The appropriate way
to mitigate adverse consequences is for courts to keep those consequences in
mind when implementing the inclusionary approach, not for courts
reflexively to exclude even highly probative pieces of evidence for the simple
reason that they materialized during a political campaign.
That, in a nutshell, is the argument this Article sets forth. But before
moving forward, I should acknowledge two limitations in this Article’s
methodological approach.25 First, this Article takes no position on the extent
to which existing Supreme Court doctrine already accommodates the
inclusionary approach. My own view is that the Court has left the issue
largely unsettled,26 although there are some pockets of doctrine that might
seem to bear one way or the other on the question.27 Others may be
interested in reading these tea leaves in an effort to predict the course that
future doctrine might take. My own concern, by contrast, is with what the
doctrine ought to provide as a matter of sound constitutional law.
The second methodological limitation is also straightforward: For
purposes of this Article, I am bracketing the question of whether courts ought
to care about government motives in the first place. To be sure, in Part I of
24
25

26

27

See infra Section III.C.
There is a further methodological point that I might as well acknowledge here: Although I recognize
that some commentators regard the labels of “purpose,” “intent,” and “motive” as capturing subtly
different ideas, see, for example, Fallon, supra note 5, at 534–35, I do not believe that any of those
distinctions make a difference for purposes of the analysis I offer. Accordingly, and unless otherwise
indicated, I use these terms interchangeably. See Kagan, supra note 6, at 426 (adopting a similar
approach).
But see Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2438 n.3 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The
Government urges us to disregard the President’s campaign statements. But nothing in our
precedent supports that blinkered approach.”).
For example, in McCreary County v. ACLU, the Court indicated that judges screening for sectarian
purposes should not “turn a blind eye to the context in which [government] policy arose.” 554
U.S. 844, 866 (2005) (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315 (2000)). But
the Court also there said that judges should “take[ ] account of the traditional external signs that
show up in the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute or comparable official
act.” Id. at 866 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court also warned against
“judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts.” Id. at 862; see also Fields, supra note 13, at
284 (noting, in the equal protection context, that “courts have largely limited their evaluation of
the evidence to official governmental records and refused to consider ‘unofficial’ or ‘extra-official’
evidence of animus”).
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this Article, I attempt to make some sense of motive-based constitutional
rules, highlighting potential rationales and justifications for treating a law’s
animating motives as relevant to its overall constitutionality. But that
analysis should not be mistaken for a comprehensive normative defense of
motive analysis itself. My claim, rather, is that to the extent that motives matter in
constitutional law, campaign communications should matter as well. I
therefore do not grapple with the oft-cited threshold objections to motivebased constitutional rules, such as the objection that it is practically difficult
(if not conceptually impossible) to attribute motives to government entities,28
or the objection that motive-based rules are futile in operation because they
too easily allow the government to “remediate” or “cure” previously
unconstitutional laws.29 These objections are important, and they may
sometimes (if not always) provide a good enough reason for courts to ignore
all potential indicators of government motive—including campaign
communications—when implementing a given constitutional norm. But
where those objections do not prevail, and where government motives
therefore become an object of constitutional inquiry, courts ought to consider
campaign communications alongside any other indicators of what motivated
the government to act. Or so I will argue below.
I. WHY MIGHT MOTIVES MATTER?
We begin with the question of why motives matter in constitutional law.
What justifies the development of doctrinal frameworks that link the
constitutionality of government action to the reasons for its implementation?
We can state the question more precisely by considering governmental
policies that are identical in substance but that appear to serve different
governmental purposes. Imagine, for instance, that one jurisdiction has
enacted a Sunday closing law because it wishes to promote rest and leisure,
whereas another jurisdiction has enacted a Sunday closing law because it
wishes to promote attendance at church. Similarly, imagine that two
neighboring school districts have adopted equivalent school assignment
schemes (with equivalent effects on the race-based composition of individual

28

29

See, e.g., J. Morris Clark, Legislation Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 953, 954 (1978) (noting that “[i]t is usually impossible to know the subjective motivation of
legislators by direct evidence, such as legislative history, with enough certainty to declare a law
unconstitutional as a result”); see also Fallon, supra note 5, at 531 (highlighting the “conceptual problem
. . . involving the aggregation of the mental states of multiple officials into a collective intent of a
decisionmaking body”). The aggregation-based difficulty, of course, does not apply where the
relevant government entity is a single government official. See Shaw, supra note 13, at 37–39.
See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (noting that “there is an element of futility” in
motive-based review, because “[i]f the law is struck down for this [motive-based] reason . . . it would
presumably be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for different
reasons”).
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schools), but that one district has done so for race-neutral reasons (for
example, to minimize transportation and other costs) and that another
district has done so for explicitly race-based reasons. Or imagine that two
states have imposed identical weight restrictions on the vehicles that may use
its roads, but that one state has done so in response to deteriorating road
conditions and that the other State has done so in an effort to channel
business to local trucking firms. In all these cases we want to know why the
badly-motivated variant of each policy should qualify as more
constitutionally suspect than its innocently-motivated counterpart. If each
set of policies purports to do the same thing, then what basis exists for
concluding that the policies should meet different constitutional fates?
In this Part, I posit four rationales for incorporating motives analysis into
constitutional adjudication. First, motives might matter because they
influence the “social meaning” of the laws to which they attach. On this
message-based rationale for motive-based inquiry, courts should monitor for
bad motives on the theory that badly-motivated laws can themselves
“express” values and norms that conflict with core constitutional guarantees.
Second, motives might matter because they furnish useful information about
the likely consequences of the government’s actions. On this effects-based
rationale, courts should monitor for bad motives on the theory that badlymotivated laws are, as a general matter, especially likely to impose salient
constitutional harms on the public at large. Third, motives might matter
because they can undermine the government’s credibility when it comes to
adducing an objectively adequate justification for a suspect law. On this
justification-based rationale, courts should monitor for bad motives on the
theory that the bad motives can have a distorting effect on the government’s
assessment of a law’s overall costs and benefits. Finally, motives might matter
because the bad motives themselves are constitutionally prohibited. On this
rules-based rationale for motive-based inquiry, courts should monitor for bad
motives on the theory that badly-motivated laws, because they are badlymotivated, violate a principle of independent constitutional significance.
A. Bad Motives Send Bad Messages
Motives might matter because they influence the “message”
communicated by a constitutionally challenged law. As expressivist theorists
have long recognized, laws exert influence not just by adjusting rights, duties,
and powers among the parties that they regulate, but also by signifying the
values, priorities, and beliefs of the communities that create them.30 In this
way two laws might end up doing the same thing while “saying” different
things. One anti-leafleting ban, for instance, might signify a community’s
30

See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of the Law: A General Restatement,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000).
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fondness for tidy sidewalks; another might signify a community’s hostility
towards unpopular speakers. Not every law need communicate a message,
and not every such message will itself be easy to discern.31 But, just as it
sometimes true that we “don’t need a weatherman to know which way the
wind blows,”32 so too will it also be true that members of a political
community can develop a reasonable sense as to what a given law is “all
about.”33
Courts might care about a law’s expressive significance for a variety of
reasons. Some laws’ messages might inflict harm on others; if a law expresses
animus or hostility, the expression itself will heighten feelings of stigma,
isolation, and fear within various segments of the political community.34
Similarly, bad expressive messages might embolden and legitimate harmful
forms of behavior by private parties,35 as might happen, for instance, when a
government’s overt endorsement of racial or religious stereotypes causes
private parties to embrace and act upon those same stereotypes.36 Further,
the bad messages reflected by one law might conflict with the good messages
reflected by another; problems can arise when one set of nonconstitutional
enactments ends up signaling acceptance or approval of values that the
Constitution itself condemns.37 In these various ways, the content of a law’s
31

32
33

34
35

36

37

See Craig Konnoth, An Expressive Theory of Privacy Intrusions, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1533, 1542 (2017)
(noting that “different segments of the community may attach different meanings to state action
depending on their own background”).
BOB DYLAN, Subterranean Homesick Blues, in BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME (Columbia Records 1965).
Cf. Todd Rakoff, Washington v. Davis and the Objective Theory of Contract, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 63, 76 (1994) (noting that “the need to attribute meaning to words or acts, and to differentiate
according to the meaning attributed, occurs throughout the law”).
See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 5, at 530 (noting that statutes might carry an “objective ‘expressive’ effect
that stigmatizes a racial or religious minority or promotes religion to a greater than de minimis extent”).
Some laws, by contrast, might send positive messages that influence social behavior in a desirable
manner. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2026 (1996)
(hypothesizing that “an appropriately framed law may influence social norms and push them in the
right direction”).
Charles Black alluded to this problem in his famous defense of Brown v. Board of Education. As Black
explained:
[S]egregation is the pattern of law in communities where the extralegal patterns of
discrimination against Negroes are the tightest, where Negroes are subjected to the strictest
codes of “unwritten law” as to job opportunities, social intercourse, patterns of housing,
going to the back door, being called by the first name, saying “Sir,” and all the rest of the
whole sorry business. Of course these things, in themselves, need not and usually do not
involve “state action,” and hence the fourteenth amendment cannot apply to them. But
they can assist us in understanding the meaning and assessing the impact of state action.
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 425 (1960).
See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights:
Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 507 (1993) (“Public
policies can violate the Constitution not only because they bring about concrete costs, but because
the very meaning they convey demonstrates inappropriate respect for relevant public values.”); see
also Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 14 (2000)
(positing an expressive theory of equal protection under which “stigma or psychological injury is
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expressive message might have some bearing on its overall constitutional
appropriateness.
That point has not been lost on the Court, whose members have
sometimes embraced expressivist logic when deciding constitutional cases. In
equal protection cases, the Court has noted that segregationist laws “denot[e]
the inferiority” of racial minorities,38 that gender-discriminatory laws can
“perpetuate . . . stereotyped view[s],”39 and that prohibitions on same-sex
marriage can “ha[ve] the effect of teaching that gays and lesbians are
unequal in important respects.”40 Race-based gerrymandering can similarly
“reinforce[ ]” and “perpetuat[e]” race-based stereotypes.41 In Establishment
Clause cases, Justice O’Connor expressed similar concern about religionendorsing laws, worrying about their tendency to “send[ ] a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community.”42 In substantive due
process cases, the Court in Lawrence v. Texas characterized a Texas antisodomy law as “demean[ing] the[ ] existence” of the petitioners “by making
their private sexual conduct a crime.”43
We can elsewhere debate the extent to which (and the means by which)
courts should consider expressive variables when deciding constitutional
cases.44 The point here, however, is simply that once the expressive message
of a law has assumed constitutional significance, then so too should the
motives of the law’s enactors. Message derives from motive: to discern what

38

39

40
41
42
43
44

not a necessary component of an Equal Protection violation”). In addition, Donald Regan has
argued that overtly protectionist legislation is constitutionally problematic for the simple reason that
its protectionist message is “antithetical to the very idea of federal union.” Donald H. Regan, The
Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV.
1091, 1126 (1986); see also Anderson & Pildes, supra note 30, at 1554 (citing to Regan while arguing
that “protectionist legislation expresses a constitutionally impermissible attitude toward the interests
of other States in the political union”).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“[E]very time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the
provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”).
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982) (noting that a Mississippi university’s
policy of “excluding males from admission to the School of Nursing tends to perpetuate the
stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman’s job”).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647–48 (1993).
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
For a dissenting viewpoint regarding the value of the expressivist project, see Matthew D. Adler,
Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1376 (2000) (criticizing
expressivism on the ground that “[t]he connection between the linguistic meaning of a legal official’s
action and what truly matters, morally speaking, about that action, is a purely contingent
connection”).

Dec. 2018]

CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATIONS

345

a law “signifies” to the public at large, courts often need to know something
about the reasons why the law came into being.45 Thus, for instance, if
lawmakers enacted a facially neutral law for race-based reasons, that law is
more likely to “express” a harmful race-based message than is an otherwise
similar law that was intended to further a race-neutral objective. So too for
laws enacted for protectionist reasons, religion-promoting reasons, speechsuppressing reasons, or any other set of reasons that might give cause for
constitutional concern. Motive, to be not sure, may not always bear on a
law’s expressive significance; some enactments may simply “speak for
themselves” in this regard. And motive itself will not always be determinative
or clarifying when it comes to defining the message that a law communicates.
But, to the extent courts are interested in trying to figure out the “message”
that a law communicates, motive-based analysis will often prove to be a
valuable tool.
But the motives made relevant by the “message-based” rationale are
limited in one important respect. Specifically, the rationale accords
relevance only to the objectively apparent motives for a law’s enactment; it
provides no good reason for caring about governmental motives kept hidden
from public view.46 Expressive harms depend on the meaning that citizens
attribute to government action, and that meaning—by definition—will
depend entirely on the motive-based evidence that the public itself has seen.
If government officials secretly favor a law because they believe it will
subordinate atheists, while publicly explaining, defending, and promoting
the law on nonsectarian grounds, it will be hard for a challenger to argue that
the officials’ private motives themselves imposed a stigma on non-believers.47
45

46

47

To be clear, the claim here is not that bad motives are a necessary condition for the expression of a
bad message. In some circumstances, even a law passed for innocent reasons might nonetheless
express a constitutionally problematic message. Rather, the claim is simply that a motive-based
inquiry will help to inform a court’s judgment as to what a law turns out to express. See Hellman,
supra note 37, at 59 (“[T]he assessment of expressive character takes the motives of those who enact
the legislation . . . as only one data point in the analysis.”).
See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 30, at 1525 (“The expressive meaning of a particular act or
practice . . . need not be in the agent’s head, the recipient’s head, or even in the heads of the general
public. Expressive meanings are socially constructed.”); Fallon, supra note 5, at 549 (characterizing
an expressivist conception of intent as “the communicative significance that a competent, informed
participant in a society would attach to a statute as an indicator of prevailing societal values”);
Rakoff, supra note 33, at 76 (suggesting that, on an objective re-formulation of the discriminatory
intent requirement, “[w]e are not really that interested in whether our officials have good or bad
souls,” but rather “in whether official action is demeaning of a minority”).
See McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 863 (2005) (“If someone in the government hides
religious motive so well that the objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and
implementation of the statute, cannot see it, then without something more the government does
not make a divisive announcement that in itself amounts to taking religious sides. A secret motive
stirs up no strife and does nothing to make outsiders of nonadherents, and it suffices to wait and see
whether such government action turns out to have (as it may even be likely to have) the illegitimate
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By the same token, if public officials privately favor a law for race-neutral
reasons, while cynically using race-based rhetoric to drum up public support
for the law, their private feelings of race-neutrality will do nothing to mitigate
the law’s stigmatic effects. If motives matter because of the public messages
lawmakers generate, then the motive-based inquiry must confine itself to only
those motives that the public believes to animate the law under review.
B. Bad Motives Yield Bad Outcomes
We have already seen one way in which a law’s underlying purposes
might influence its real-world impact: By shaping the social meaning of the
laws to which they attach, bad government motives might contribute to
expressivist harms that follow from public understandings of the message that
it sends. But there is another sense in which motives and effects interrelate:
Badly motivated laws, on balance, are more likely to generate bad
constitutional outcomes.48 Even if government motives do not themselves
give rise to harm, the motives might nonetheless correlate with policies that
yield adverse effects. That correlation, even if imperfect, would provide
courts with a further reason to consider the government’s reasons for acting.
By asking whether a law derived from a permissible or impermissible
governmental purpose, courts would be gauging—albeit indirectly—the
law’s likelihood to alter the regulatory status quo in a constitutionally
problematic way.
This idea finds expression in Elena Kagan’s discussion of motive-based
analysis within First Amendment law. In a well-known law review article
from 1996, then-Professor Kagan identified within free-speech doctrine a
variety of different rules and tests that operated as “devices to detect the

48

effect of advancing religion.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
One could, of course, characterize the message-based rationale as subsumed by the effects-based
rationale, at least insofar as the message-based rationale highlights a type of bad outcome to which
badly-motivated enactments can give rise. But I believe that the categories are usefully
distinguished, for two reasons. First, as noted, the message-based rationale supports an inquiry into
apparent government motives, whereas—as we will see below—a rationale premised on nonexpressivist outcomes supports an inquiry into actual motives. See infra text accompanying notes
73–77. Second, the message-based rationale, unlike the outcome-based rationale, can itself be
articulated in non-consequentialist terms; that is, one might worry about the “bad messages” sent
by a badly-motivated law for reasons that have nothing to do those messages’ harmful effects. See,
e.g., Hellman, supra note 37, at 14 (advancing an expressivist claim that “explicitly denies that the
wrong is rooted in consequentialist concerns); see also Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate
Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494, 568 (2003) (contrasting a “consequentialist” account
of expressive harm, which “looks at the communicative impact of a law or legal regime,” with a
“revelatory” account, which “raises the problem of expressive harm . . . not by having some
practical communicative impact on society, but by expressing, in the sense of evincing, the worldview
of the state actor that made the law”).
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presence of illicit motive.”49 One justification for the doctrine’s emphasis on
motive, Kagan suggested, had to do with the correlation between bad
motives and bad consequences: Courts might sensibly screen for illicit
governmental purposes as a means of capturing those laws most likely to
effectuate bad free-speech policy. If, for instance, the aim of the First
Amendment is to preserve “[a] state of public discourse . . . most illuminating
to and desired by an ideally curious and engaged audience,”50 then courts
should be especially hesitant to uphold any law whose underlying purpose is
to suppress or punish the expression of certain ideas. The problem with such
a law lies not in the “censorial motive” itself; rather, it lies in the very real
risk that the law will succeed at achieving its enactors’ aims: As Kagan puts
it, “[w]hen self-interest or ideological hostility enters into a restriction on
speech, the odds increase that the resulting action will impoverish the sphere
of public discourse.”51 Consequently, judicial efforts to eliminate badlymotivated restrictions on speech might indirectly operate to “promote the set
of outcomes that the audience-based model deems desirable.”52
At first glance, as Kagan herself acknowledges, probing for problematic
motives seems like a “strangely circuitous” way of probing for problematic
effects.53 After all, if effects are what we care about, courts could simply
evaluate those effects directly and on their own terms.54 Nonetheless, as
Kagan notes, a direct inquiry into the nature of a law’s effects will sometimes
prove infeasible or at least difficult to conduct, such that even an indirect,
motive-oriented proxy for effects will sometimes prove useful.55 Regarding
speech prohibitions and public discourse, for example, courts may “not
possess a fully developed sense of what an optimal marketplace of ideas would
look like,” and thus rely on effects-based standards that are “insufficiently
definite and detailed to lend themselves to direct application.”56 Where this
is so, the “focus on motive” can “provide[ ] an indirect way of identifying
49

50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Kagan, supra note 6, at 416; see also Lawrence A. Alexander, Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionality,
15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925, 931 (1978) (noting that a forbidden motive “undoubtedly is selected
because of the social effects associated with it”); Ristroph, supra note 4, at 1385 (noting the view that
“by basing legal liability on certain intentions, we can prevent or reduce the bad results associated
with those intentions”); Gordon G. Young, Justifying Motive Analysis in Judicial Review, 17 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 191, 198 (2008) (“The everyday notion that people who aim at bad states of
affairs are likely to bring them into existence goes a long way to justify concern with motives.”).
Kagan, supra note 6, at 507.
Id. at 507–08.
Id. at 508.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Young, supra note 49, at 238 (“Let us recall once more that while a consequentialist would
prefer to go straight to an assessment of consequences by skipping reasons, this is not practically
possible. The particular consequences of an action may be impossible for a court to see, and even
political branch actors cannot see the results comprehensively.”).
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actions with untoward effects on public discourse.”57
Kagan’s point applies directly to free speech review, but it is not difficult
to see how a similar relationship might hold in other doctrinal contexts. In
Dormant Commerce Clause litigation, the presence or absence of
protectionist motives may prove useful in determining whether a state
regulation is likely to balkanize the interstate marketplace. In the abortion
context, lawmakers’ desire to erect “substantial obstacles” to pre-viability
abortions may provide extra reason to worry about a law’s tendency to do
just that. And in other areas of the law, officials’ reasons for acting might
bolster (if not wholly confirm) suspicions about the consequences of their
actions.58 To be sure, sometimes those consequences will be sufficiently selfevident as to obviate the need for any inquiry into motive at all. But where
there exists uncertainty about the scope and extent of a law’s outcomes, the
government’s expressed desire to produce those outcomes should qualify as
a reason to worry about those outcomes coming to pass.
Suppose, then, that we choose to scrutinize government motive in an
effort to better understand a law’s likely on-the-ground effects. What sort of
inquiry should we conduct? Here, we should train our focus on actual rather
than apparent motives. We should strive to discern the true animating
objectives of government officials, and we should not care whether those
objectives were hidden away or widely disclosed. In contrast to the
messaging-based rationale for motive analysis, the effects-based rationale
depends only on a factual inference that flows straight from the motives of
lawmakers to the consequences of the laws they enact. In other words, what
matters on the effects-based rationale is the simple fact of the government’s
commitment to a given regulatory purpose: it is that commitment—and not
anything that government officials have said or done in relation to that
commitment—that makes the bad outcomes more likely. Consequently, if
we are interested in drawing effects-based inferences from evidence of
government motive, we will need to see evidence that identifies the true
animating forces that motivated the government to act.

57
58

Kagan, supra note 6, at 509.
Ben Sachs has suggested, for instance, that motive-based inquiries might helpfully support effects
based inferences within certain areas of labor preemption analysis. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite
Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1214 (2011) (“[B]y
identifying, for example, legislation passed with improper motives (that is, passed because of the
legislation’s effect of reordering organizing rules), it might be possible to smoke out legislation that
has impermissible effects.” (citing Kagan, supra note 6, at 507–08)); see also id. at 1214 n.304 (“[E]ven
if preemption analysis is concerned solely with a state action’s ‘effect on federal rights,’ motive
analysis might be an approach to determine these effects.”).
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C. Bad Motives Reveal Bad Justifications
The previous Section considered the relationship between bad motives
and negative constitutional effects. But motives might also figure into the
equation by helping courts to evaluate the extent of any countervailing
benefits that might help to justify those effects. Call this the “justificationbased” rationale for motives analysis. Courts often must determine whether
a challenged law is sufficiently well-tailored to serve a sufficiently important
regulatory objective, and they therefore must often decide whether to credit
a government’s claim that a challenged law works well to serve an objectively
valid regulatory need.59 A law enacted to achieve an illegitimate objective
can obviously not be justified by reference to the illegitimate objective itself.
But more than that, evidence of that bad motive may frustrate the
government’s efforts to justify a law by reference to an altogether separate,
and potentially more legitimate end. As Professor Gordon Young has
elsewhere put the point, “the presence of an illegitimate mental state
animating an action might correlate at a usefully high level with the absence
of any alternative and sufficient objective reason for such action, were courts
to search extensively for such reasons.”60
We can illustrate the idea with a hypothetical. Suppose I have recently
decided to cancel a late-semester class and that you have been asked to
determine whether there exists a valid justification for my doing so. Suppose
further that you know the actual reason why I’m pursuing the cancelation—
I want to attend the opening day of “Jazz Fest” in New Orleans—and you
are quite confident that this is a bad reason for canceling class. Not
contesting that conclusion in any way, I nevertheless posit an alternative
justification for my decision. Regardless of why I actually canceled class, I
argue, the cancelation is a good and appropriate thing. My students, I
explain to you, have become mentally exhausted by the crushing workload,
and a day off from class will afford them a much-needed opportunity to catch
their collective breath before getting ready for exams. Consequently, even
though my decision to cancel class may have been badly motivated, it turns
out that the cancelation will enhance the well-being of my students and—by
extension—their performance on my exam. And that happy outcome, I
argue, should wholly suffice to validate my decision after the fact.
Now, it may or may not be true that my decision would have this salutary
effect (and it may or may not be true that this salutary effect would in any event
suffice to justify the cancelation). But put those issues to one side. The central
point here is that you should be highly skeptical of my representation to you
that the effect is likely to occur. My improper motives for canceling class have
59
60

See Michael Coenen, More Restrictive Alternatives, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (describing the
mechanics of means/ends analysis).
Young, supra note 49, at 240.
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rendered me an unreliable spokesperson for that position. And that remains
so even if you might normally defer to me on matters of student wellbeing and
pedagogical need. The problem is that my desire to attend Jazz Fest has likely
distorted my own assessment of these issues, such that my arguments look less
like the product of a dispassionate assessment of matters within my expertise
and more like manufactured, post-hoc rationalizations for a decision that was
already made. In particular, you should worry that I am articulating not so
much the end-product of a serious pedagogical inquiry as I am a preordained
conclusion that my inquiry was reverse-engineered to produce.
This hypothetical illustrates another reason why courts might care about
government motive: Specifically, it suggests that the government’s past
attachment to bad motives can have credibility-undermining effects on whatever
justifications the government might invoke on a law’s behalf. Judges lack the
time, expertise, and institutional capacity necessary to examine from scratch
the overall importance of a regulatory interest and/or the degree of a law’s
means/ends fit. As a result, they will often hesitate to question the
government’s own representations as to the extent of the need and the degree
of the fit.61 But even if such concerns might support a default posture of
judicial deference to claims of regulatory need, so too might particularized
concerns about government motive support an occasional override of the
default. More specifically, evidence of bad motives gives the court reason to
worry about the government’s credibility as a communicator of high-quality
justifications. Having harbored invidious motives when it put the law into
place, the government has forfeited its presumed credibility in invoking any
other objective on the law’s behalf.62 The finding of bad motive, as Professor
Young again puts it, “impeaches the trustworthiness of the political branches
in a way that disqualifies them from making such judgments in the usual de
facto final way.”63
61

62

63

Courts often admit to doing this, for instance, when the government defends its measures on
grounds related to public safety or national security. As the Court itself has acknowledged, “neither
the Members of this Court nor most federal judges begin the day with briefings that may describe
new and serious threats to our Nation and its people,” and it is therefore “vital in this context not
to substitute . . . our own evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative
Branch.” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34 (2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S.
57, 68 (1981)); see also id. at 33 (“Th[e] evaluation of the [national security-related] facts by the
Executive, like Congress’s assessment, is entitled to deference.”).
Professor Ely alluded to this idea when he suggested that the Court’s identification of badlymotivated action should “make it somewhat skeptical of claims of a subsequent change of heart.”
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 138 (1980).
Here, to be sure, the credibility-undermining effect of a demonstrably bad motive goes to a
somewhat different question—namely, whether the government has eliminated its embrace of a
suspect motive when attempting to re-enact a policy. But the connection between past bad motives
and present-day credibility is largely the same.
Young, supra note 49, at 240. Paul Brest may have had a similar idea in mind when he set forth his
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This observation might help to account for the Court’s practice of
subjecting certain types of laws to heightened scrutiny—demanding, in
effect, that the government satisfy a higher-than-normal justificatory burden
when it discriminates on the basis of certain “suspect” classifications. The
Court has explained its willingness to strictly scrutinize laws that discriminate
on the basis of race, alienage, and national origin by pointing out that “[such]
factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect
prejudice and antipathy.”64 These types of classifications, the argument goes,
are likely to reflect (or provoke) biased, prejudicial, or stereotype-driven
modes of thinking. Consequently, officials who formulate policies by
reference to such classifications should receive a level of deference that is less
than what they normally would receive. To be sure, bad motives need not
always accompany the use of suspect classifications; it is certainly possible to
rely on race-based distinctions without embracing discriminatory animus.65
Nevertheless, we might regard the risk of bad motives as high enough to
warrant an across-the-board presumption to that effect—one that simply
stipulates a connection between suspect classifications and improper
regulatory aims.66 And with that stipulation in place, the need for heightened
scrutiny becomes evident: The strong possibility that bad motives entered
into the government’s decision-making calculus militates against reflexive
deference to the government when it attempts to justify the law in court.67

64

65

66

67

own approach to motive-based judicial review, although Brest’s account was not articulated in quite
such explicitly consequentialist terms. See Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem
of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 116–17 (“In our governmental system
. . . only the political decisionmaker—and not the judiciary—has general authority to assess the
utility and fairness of a decision. And, since the [badly-motivated] decisionmaker has (by
hypothesis) assigned an incorrect value to a relevant factor, the party has been deprived of his only
opportunity for a full, proper assessment.”).
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); see also id. at 440–41
(justifying intermediate scrutiny for sex- and gender-based laws on the ground that “statutes
distributing benefits and burdens between the sexes in different ways very likely reflect outmoded
notions of the relative capabilities of men and women”).
The Court itself has suggested as much. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(upholding a race-conscious admissions program on the ground that it was narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest).
See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW
26 (2002) (“The doctrine of suspect classification rests on a judgment that, whenever a classification
of a certain sort is used, a court is justified in presuming that ‘a motivating factor in the decision’
was the illicit motive ordinarily associated with that classification in the minds of at least some of
the citizenry.”).
The analytical relationship I have described here bears an uneasy relationship to the oft-cited
suggestion that “strict scrutiny” and other forms of heightened means/ends analysis serve the
purpose of smoking out improper motives. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 62, at 145–48 (suggesting that
“special scrutiny,” and in particular its demands for a close fit between classification and the
asserted legislative goals “turns out to be a way of ‘flushing out’ unconstitutional motivation”);
Kagan, supra note 6, at 414 (arguing that “First Amendment law . . . has as its primary, though
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unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental motives”); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action,
107 YALE L.J. 427, 428 (1997) (noting that “[o]ne powerful function of strict scrutiny has always
been that of ‘smoking out’ invidious purposes masquerading behind putatively legitimate public
policy”); see also Coenen, supra note 59, at 47–51 (suggesting that courts might sometimes utilize
means/ends analysis for the purposes of questioning the sincerity of the government’s commitment
to a given regulatory objective). But see Nelson, supra note 5, at 1843 (noting that “neither Justice
Stone nor the rest of the Court seems to have understood heightened scrutiny as a way of detecting
unconstitutional motivations,” and that “[a]s originally applied, the Carolene Products idea was more
about effects than about purposes”); Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test
and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 394–97 (2006) (suggesting that, within the context of
First and Fourteenth Amendment review, the Justices initially conceptualized means/ends analysis
as a “jurisprudence of cost-benefit analysis, not motive discovery”). On this view of the inquiry,
motive-based findings should operate as an output rather than an input of a court’s application of
a means/ends test. Thus, in contrast to my account here, which sees evidence of illicit intent as
contributing to a finding that the government’s regulatory justifications are weak, the “motives as
object” account sees a conclusion that the government’s regulatory justifications are weak as
contributing to a finding that a law derived from illicit motives in the first place. And the latter
account raises an apparent difficulty with the logic of treating motive-based evidence as relevant to
an assessment of regulatory justifications. That is, if the whole point of a means/ends analysis is to
reveal the existence of bad government motives, then my argument posits a circuitous and
potentially even circular means of achieving this result: bad subjective motives point to weak
objective justifications which in turn point back to bad subjective motives.
I concede that if the whole point of a means/ends test is to support a conclusion about bad
motives, then direct evidence of bad motive might sometimes obviate the need to engage in any
means/ends analysis at all. At the same time, one can imagine scenarios in which motive-based
inputs might usefully inform the Court’s application of a motive-centered means/ends test. In
particular, the Court might begin its application of the test with tentative (but not dispositive)
evidence that a law derived from bad motives. That evidence, though not sufficient in isolation to
warrant an invalidation of the law, would at least suffice to justify reduced judicial deference to the
government’s claim of regulatory need. Withholding such deference, the Court might then discover
that the challenged law is in fact severely over- and/or under-inclusive with respect to the regulatory
interest on which the government’s justification relies. Initial suspicions of bad motive would thus
help to reveal the weakness of the government’s own justification, which would in turn function to
confirm that those suspicions were in fact correct. In that way, even if a conclusion about bad
motives is the overarching goal of the inquiry, initial evidence of bad motive might usefully drive
that inquiry forward. The analytical relationship between motives and justifications need not
proceed in exclusively one direction. Inferences about motives and assessments of justifications
might instead reinforce one another in an iterative, back-and-forth-type fashion.
What is more, there are difficulties with characterizing the means/ends analysis as exclusively
centered on the goal of smoking out bad motives. For one thing, at least some forms of means/ends
analysis quite explicitly leave open the possibility that a law might withstand constitutional scrutiny
even if the government had bad reasons for enacting it. This is most obviously true with respect to
rational basis review. See, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (noting that,
for purposes of rational-basis review, “[w]here . . . there are plausible reasons for Congress’[s]
action, our inquiry is at an end,” and that “[i]t is, of course, ‘constitutionally irrelevant whether this
reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision.’”). But the principle arguably holds in connection
with some applications of heightened scrutiny as well. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 5, at 556 (“In a
number of cases the Supreme Court has held that a finding of discriminatory or otherwise forbidden
legislative intent will provoke strict judicial scrutiny but not necessarily require a statute’s
invalidation, regardless of issues of but-for causation.”). That approach makes sense if one
conceptualizes means/ends analysis as a sort of “weighted balancing test,” whose ultimate object
relates not to the presence or absence of bad motives, but rather to the question of whether a law’s
regulatory benefits are significant enough to warrant tolerating its adverse constitutional effects.
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Like the effects-based rationale, the justification-based rationale supports
a particular type of motive-based inquiry—one that, once again, focuses on
actual rather than apparent motives. The relationship between bad motives
and bad justifications stems from the trustworthiness of the government itself;
the government’s motives matter because they diminish our willingness to
accept at face value the government’s statements of regulatory need. And that
being so, it is the motives the government did in fact embrace—rather than
motives it might have seemed to embrace—that courts ought to care about.
If, for instance, government actors never seriously regarded a law as a
necessary public-safety measure (while advertising it as such to the public at
large), then courts would have no reason to trust any subsequent claims by the
government that the law really does promote community safety in an
important way. Conversely, if government actors secretly regard a law as a
necessary public-safety measure (while cynically drumming up support for it
with appeals to prejudice and stereotype), then courts would have no reason
to doubt the seriousness of the government’s safety-related concerns. (To be
clear, in this latter scenario, the bad apparent motives might still justify a
decision to invalidate the law, but they would do so on grounds unrelated to
the law’s effectiveness as a public safety measure.) To the extent that courts
consider governmental motives for the purpose of calibrating the level of
deference to the government’s claim of regulatory need, they should therefore
want to know what actually motivated the government to do what it did.
D. Bad Motives Are Bad Motives
The discussion thus far has canvassed instrumentalist reasons for
attending to the motives of government decision-makers, highlighting ways
in which motive-based inquiries will help courts to achieve some broader
constitutional goal. Sometimes, however, this discussion may be largely
beside the point. That is, badly motivated government action might itself
amount to a constitutional wrong, separate and apart from whatever
“messages” it might send, whatever outcomes it might presage, and whatever
justifications it might undercut. Call this the “rule-based” rationale for
motive-based inquiry. On this account, courts must screen for bad motives
for the simple reason that they violate a rule against bad motives.
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1306–08 (2007)
(developing this account); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 67, at 428 (acknowledging that within certain
areas of doctrine, strict scrutiny has become “a cost-benefit test measuring whether a law that falls
(according to the Court itself) squarely within the prohibition of the equal protection guarantee is
justified by the specially important social gains that it will achieve”). Obviously, on such a
“weighted balancing” account of the means/ends test, there would be nothing redundant or
circuitous about a court relying on motive-based inferences for purposes of demonstrating the
weakness of a law’s underlying justification.
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This might be true in one of two senses. First, depending on one’s
adjudicative methodology, certain sources of constitutional law—such as text,
history, or structure68—may simply command attention to motives when
certain types of cases arise.69 We could inquire into the reasons underlying
that command, but the soundness of those reasons won’t have any bearing
on the fact that the command must be followed. If I am tasked with applying
a constitutional rule that prohibits the wearing of green hats, the rule itself is
all I need to tell me that red hat-wearing is legally out of bounds. I can validly
distinguish between green hat wearers and non-green hat wearers without
ever developing a satisfactory account as to why the former are “worse” than
the latter. By the same token, some sources of constitutional law may simply
compel the conclusion that some badly-motivated forms of governmental
action are more problematic than innocently-motivated actions that are
otherwise equivalent. If so, that is all we need to know.
Second, and more broadly, bad motives may offend some nonconsequentialist principle, norm, or value that we associate with a given
constitutional provision. Kagan has suggested, for instance, that any
governmental effort to “limit speech based on its sense of which ideas have
merit” would problematically “expropriate an authority not intended for it
and negate a critical aspect of self-government.”70 Justice Harlan’s famous
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson articulated a similarly non-consequentialist
rationale for a strict bar on race-based government action; such action,
Harlan famously contended, offends the idea that “[o]ur Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”71
68

69

70
71

I am excluding precedent from this list because—unlike considerations mandated by text, history,
and structure—considerations mandated by precedent are only as strong as the stare decisis norms
that make the precedent binding. Given the always-present possibility of overruling precedent,
precedent-based considerations—unlike text-based, history-based, or structure-based mandates—
may require some level of extrinsic validation in order to retain their force. The more arbitraryseeming the precedent, the greater the risk of abandonment by a subsequent court—even a court
whose Justices are steadfastly committed to the common law method. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (noting that a departure from stare decisis may be justified
where “related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a
remnant of abandoned doctrine,” or where “facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently,
as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification”). Contrastingly, if strong
textual, historical, or structural evidence points to an arbitrary-seeming rule, the arbitrariness of the
rule itself provides no reason for rejecting it on textual, historical, or structural grounds.
See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(observing that “the secular purpose requirement [of the Lemon test] is squarely based in the text of
the Establishment Clause it helps to enforce”). Of course, the argument can work in the opposite
direction as well, with courts citing to text-based, historical-based, and/or structural considerations
as categorically foreclosing inquiry into governmental motive. See, e.g., Hansen v. United States, 65
Fed. Cl. 76, 81 (2005) (noting that “the plain meaning of the Takings Clause . . . contains no state
of mind requirement”).
Kagan, supra note 6, at 513.
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Patrick S. Shin, Diversity v. Colorblindness,
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Surveying the landscape more generally, Richard Pildes has suggested that
many constitutional norms require courts to “determin[e] whether
government’s reasons for acting are consistent with the kind of reasons that
make acts of political authority in a particular sphere legitimate.”72 In these
and other ways, courts might condemn the government for relying on some
inference that it has no business relying on or for pursuing some goal that it
has no business pursuing. And in so doing, courts would have no need to
justify the prohibition of bad motives by reference to anything other than the
badness of the motives themselves.
In contrast to its message-based, results-based, and justification-based
counterparts, the rule-based rationale for motives analysis does not identify
a single “type” of motives analysis that courts must conduct. Rather, on this
rationale, the nature of the motive-based inquiry will depend on the
particular rule or principle mandating the inquiry. We are here positing not
a single, universal mandate that flatly condemns all “badly”-motivated action
across the board, but rather a collection of substance-specific mandates that
mark out particular types of “bad” motives for particular reasons—reasons
whose persuasiveness, moreover, will vary depending on the methodological
and philosophical proclivities of the judge deciding the case. That being so,
there is no “one right manner” in which all rule-based inquiries into motive
must proceed. Some rules or principles may demand inquiry into apparent
motives but not actual motives; other rules or principles may demand inquiry
into actual motives but not apparent motives; and still other rules or
principles may demand inquiry into combinations or variations of the two.
The important point for now is simply that, unlike the other rationales we
have considered, the rules-based rationale permits little in the way of
generalized prescription and analysis. If a court has inquired into motives
because some rule requires it to do so, the adequacy of the court’s inquiry
will depend on the particularities of the rule itself.

***

72

2009 BYU L. REV. 1175, 1211 (2009) (characterizing Harlan’s argument as “invok[ing] the
fundamental, non-instrumental norm of equal respect”).
Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 711, 714 (1994).

356

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:2

Having identified the various rationales for motive-based analysis in
constitutional law, let us now turn to the specific question that this article
poses: Should campaign communications inform courts’ assessment of government motives?
Assuming that some area of doctrine has identified certain types of motives
as suspect or altogether proscribed, we want to know whether courts may
look to an official’s campaign communications when asking whether those
motives exist. The question, to repeat, is not whether motive-based analysis
itself is a good idea. Rather, it is whether motive-based analysis ought to
proceed in a manner that accords no relevance to statements made in
connection with an electoral campaign. Can one justifiably contend that
motives should matter but campaign communications should not?
One might attempt to do so in two different ways. The first justification
would appeal to considerations of relevance and evidentiary value; in essence, this
argument would contend that campaign communications tell us nothing useful
about government motives and ought therefore to be shunned. The second
justification, by contrast, would appeal to considerations of regulatory effect; even
if campaign communications might sometimes prove relevant, this argument
would contend that intolerable results would follow from courts giving them
evidentiary weight. The next two Parts address each argument in turn.
II. THE EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATIONS
In the previous Part, I identified four different reasons why courts might
care about motives when evaluating the constitutionality of government
action. I also suggested that these different rationales for motive analysis were
likely to give rise to different forms of motives analysis, with the type of motive
to be identified largely based on the reasons why a court cares about motives
in the first place. More specifically, I suggested that: (a) the messages-based
rationale supports an inquiry into the publicly apparent reasons for a law’s
enactment; (b) both the effects-based and justifications-based rationales
support an inquiry into the subjectively embraced reasons for a law’s
enactment; (c) and that the rules-based rationale leaves open a range of
different possibilities.
In assessing the evidentiary value of campaign communications, it will
therefore be helpful to separate out the different types of motives for which
courts might screen. Taking that approach, this Part begins by considering
the relationship between campaign communications and “apparent
motives”—one as to which I think the most straightforward case for an
evidentiary linkage can be made. This Part then considers the relationship
between campaign communications and “actual motives,” concluding that
here too, despite some complications, campaign communications can
provide useful information regarding the government’s “true” reasons for
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acting. Finally, this Part concludes by considering the various forms of
motive analysis that might fall under the rubric of the rule-based account.
Here, in particular, I acknowledge the possibility that the operative rule
might define the proscribed motives in such a way as to render campaign
communications wholly non-probative of the motive to be sought. But I also
suggest that any such definition would be difficult to derive and defend.
A. Apparent Motives
If the basis for our examining government motives is expressivist in
nature, then we should be interested in learning the publicly apparent
reasons for the enactment of a law.73 Those reasons may or may not align
with the actual motivating factors that prompted governmental officials to
act. But they remain relevant insofar as they help to shape the message that
the law communicates to the political community writ large.
Campaign communications might help to illustrate publicly apparent
motives in two different ways. First, and most obviously, candidates promote
policies on the campaign trail, and in so doing, state reasons why they support
those policies.74 Where those same candidates win elections and thereupon
act to enshrine those policies in law, reasonable observers will fairly attribute
those officials’ actions to whatever motivating reasons those officials cited on
the campaign trail. If Candidate A promotes Policy A on the ground that it
alone will produce Result A, an outside observer will (or at last may well)
assume that Candidate A’s subsequent implementation of Policy A is
motivated by a desire to produce Result A. The campaign itself will have
created a public association between Policy A and desired Result A and that
association will affect the reasonable observer’s subsequent understanding of
the Policy itself.
Second, and more broadly, candidates reveal to the world a set of values,
opinions, and worldviews that may subsequently shape public perceptions of
subsequent official actions. Democratic strategist David Axelrod has
observed that campaigns are “like an MRI for the soul—whoever you are,
eventually people find out.”75 That may be overstating things a bit;
73

74

75

See Hellman, supra note 37, at 39 (noting that, within an expressivist framework, “[i]f objective
meaning is determinative, evidence of subjective intent matters only so long as that evidence
contributes to the public meaning of the action”); see also id. (“For example, private notes may be
good direct evidence of subjective intent but are useless in determining what the law or policy
expresses precisely because they are private.”).
See,
e.g.,
Hillary’s
Vision
for
America,
OFF. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON,
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (stating the reasons for a
number of different policies from Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign).
DAVID AXELROD, BELIEVER: MY FORTY YEARS IN POLITICS 462 (2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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politicians, after all, can cultivate and maintain public personas that differ
from their true personalities, at least in certain respects.76 But whether or not
it reflects a true representation of the candidate’s inner soul, the belief
structure projected on the campaign trail is one that will likely inform public
perceptions of the candidate’s subsequent actions. If, for instance, Candidate
A reveals herself to harbor racial prejudices, then members of the public will
be more likely to find a racially discriminatory intent lurking behind
ostensibly race-neutral policies that the Candidate later comes to put in
place. If Candidate A reveals herself to abhor a particular viewpoint or
ideology, then members of the public will be more likely to find a viewpointdiscriminatory motive lurking behind a law that suppresses the expression of
that ideology. This is all a simple reflection of the fact that (1) campaigns
help to define the political identities of those who run for office and (2) those
identities, once established, can inform public judgments about the values
and beliefs that underlie official action.
Two features of campaign communications, moreover, may actually
render them especially probative of a law’s “social meaning.” First, campaigns
can be especially high-profile affairs; that is always true of presidential
elections, but it often is true of statewide and local elections as well. The
distinctive visibility of campaigns suggests that statements made during them
may more often and more effectively penetrate public consciousness than
statements made during the course of run-of-the-mill governmental
operations. When laws get enacted and policies get implemented, members
of the public may be more likely to view those laws and policies through the
prism of the preceding political campaign rather than through the prism of
legislative floor debates and administrative records. To be sure, the
relationship is not one-to-one; some campaign communications fly below the
radar, and some “official” communications seize public attention.
Nonetheless, it will often be the case that a statement’s status as a “campaign
communication” may give us more rather than less reason to treat that
statement as a valuable contributor to a law’s expressive message.
Second, pre-election communications differ from post-election
communications in the important sense that only the former constitute part
of the public record against which voters make their decisions. That being
so, some campaign communications of an especially high-profile nature
might appear to receive the tacit assent of the polity if and when a candidate
wins office. To the extent those communications connect up with a law that
the winning candidate helps to put into place, the expressive harms generated
by the law are amplified by the fact that the communications came before

76

See, e.g., DAN NIMMO & CHEVELLE NEWSOME, POLITICAL COMMENTATORS IN THE UNITED
STATES IN THE 20TH CENTURY: A BIO-CRITICAL SOURCEBOOK 4–5 (1997) (describing the efforts
of Edward L. Bernays to recast President Calvin Coolidge as a “warm, sympathetic human being”).
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rather than after constituents’ votes were cast. Where public officials reveal
bad motives after assuming office, observers can at least entertain the
possibility that the bad motives reflect desires, values, and beliefs that most
of their co-citizens would reject. But that inference becomes weaker where
those same desires, values, and beliefs constituted part of the informational
backdrop against which the political community voted. In this scenario, the
bad motives are plausibly attributable not just to the candidate who made
the motive-revealing communications, but also to the constituency that,
having heard those communications, chose to elect the candidate in spite of
(or, worse yet, because of) what the candidate said. From the perspective of
the individuals who bear the brunt of the bad message, the expressive “sting”
becomes all the more severe.
B. Actual Motives
Unlike the message-based rationale for motives analysis, the effects-based
and justification-based rationales call for an inquiry into motives that are
actual rather than apparent. If a court knows what public officials actually
want to achieve, then that same court becomes better positioned to evaluate
both the positive and negative effects of their handiwork. Where, for
instance, courts uncover a subjective desire to cause some sort of
constitutionally salient harm, they may plausibly infer that the harm is
especially likely to occur. And where courts uncover a disconnect between
the motives underlying a law and the justifications said to support it, they
may plausibly question the strength of the justifications themselves. Thus,
from the perspective of both these rationales, we are interested in knowing
what actually motivated government officials to do what they did.
In an ideal world, we could answer this question by entering the
subjective consciousness of each official and recording what we find there.
But this we cannot do. Instead, we must gather extrinsic evidence and
deduce as best we can what we suspect to be going on in the official’s mind.
Past votes for past policies, for instance, may provide a clue as to why an
official supports a present-day policy.77 Political affiliations and group
memberships may be similarly informative; if a politician’s fellow travelers
are known to support a policy for a particular reason, we might reasonably
assume, at least as a default matter, that the politician herself supports the
same policy for the same reason. But among the most useful such sources
available to us will be the subject’s own first-person reporting about what her
own motives are. Where a public official has openly acknowledged the
influence of a given motivating factor, the acknowledgment itself provides a
77

See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977) (“The historical
background of the decision is one evidentiary source, particularly if it reveals a series of official
actions taken for invidious purposes.”).
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basis for thinking that the motivating factor really did influence the official in
the way that she herself described. To be sure, the subject might simply be
lying or saying what she thinks her constituents want to hear. But if we are
trying to divine official motive, the official’s own statements about her own
motives would at least seem to be a useful place to start. And indeed, within
a variety of different contexts courts frequently consider a subject’s own
statements as indicative of what was going on in the subject’s own head.78
The question then becomes whether campaign communications have
anything useful to offer to this inquiry. Are campaign communications so
much less reliable than other sorts of communications that we should
categorically exclude them from our evidentiary inquiry? I see two potential
grounds for making such a distinction, but neither strikes me as sufficiently
persuasive to warrant a categorical, exclusionary approach.
First, we might claim that a candidate’s statements about motive are
unreliable because they lack a sufficient temporal connection to the legal actions
we consider.79 Candidates often launch their campaigns years before their
eventually assuming office, and they will thus begin talking about what they’re
going to do well in advance of their actually doing it. That can create a time
lag between a candidate’s statements about policy and the actual
implementation of policy—a time lag during which intervening events might
alter a candidate’s mental state. When a President speaks just prior to signing
a bill (or a legislator speaks just prior to voting for that bill), we do not need to
worry much about the possibility that the motive-revealing statements
becoming an obsolete indicator of the bill’s underlying purpose. But when
the relevant statement comes from a long-ago campaign speech, we cannot
be sure that the one-time-candidate still adheres to the beliefs and motivations
that she expressed way back when she made her case to the voters.
It is probably true that statements about motive lose their probative value
as they fade into the past. But a wholesale exclusionary approach to
campaign communications would prove a clumsy means of confronting that
reality. Some campaign communications may be roughly contemporaneous
with government action. (Consider in particular the candidate running for
re-election while continuing to conduct governmental business.) And some
non-campaign communications may be uttered well before the relevant
78

79

See Fallon, supra note 5, at 580 (noting that “[t]he remarks of a single legislator in legislative debate
may provide only weak evidence of the intentions or purposes of other members, but very strong
evidence regarding the speaker’s intent”); see also Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268 (noting that
“contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body” can be “highly relevant” to a
determination of discriminatory intent).
I am not aware of this argument having been directly asserted in the case law. But it is perhaps
alluded to in some judges’ stated fears that campaign-cognizant review might lead to the review of
an official’s statements that were made “from a previous campaign, or from a previous business
conference, or from college.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 650 (4th
Cir.), vacated in part, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017).
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government action takes place. (Consider an inauguration speech about
legislation that takes several years to pass.) It may well be that campaign
communications are more likely to present timeliness issues than are other
indicators of government motive. But the connection is no means ironclad,
and temporal distance is in any event easy to measure on its own terms. That
being so, excluding all campaign statements from the evidentiary record
would reflect both an over- and under-inclusive approach to dealing with to
timeliness issues. The better approach would simply treat timeliness itself as
a factor that bears on a statement’s evidentiary weight.
Second, campaign communications might prove especially unreliable
due to the competitive nature of campaigning. A candidate’s goal is to win
more votes than his opponent, and much of what that candidate says and
does during the campaign will be in the sole service of that goal. Thus, when
we consider what officials said during campaigns, we must acknowledge the
complicated relationship between what those officials actually believed and
what they believed the public wanted them to believe. Call this the “mere
puffery” objection: Campaign communications reveal very little of
significance about the true aims and intentions of the candidates who make
them. The idea is captured in Judge Kozinski’s recent observation that “[n]o
shortage of dark purpose can be found by sifting through the daily promises
of a drowning candidate, when in truth the poor shlub’s only intention is to
get elected.”80
This is a stronger argument for excluding campaign statements from the
evidentiary record, but it is not strong enough. To begin, the argument
seems to prove too much. If we are concerned about pandering and puffery
coming from candidates for office, we should also be concerned about
pandering and puffery coming from officials in office—officials who still have
incentives to get re-elected, acquire influence within the party, and curry
favor with their constituents. Politicians certainly play politics before getting
elected, but they continue to do so after getting elected. And that reality has
not yet persuaded courts to treat all statements of government officials as
categorically unreliable indicators of government motive. Consequently, if
courts are willing and able to separate out the sincerity from the puffery when
80

Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Notice that
the mere puffery objection is non-responsive to judicial efforts to discern objectively apparent
motives, unless, that is, the politicians’ statements are so disingenuous as to appear as such to the
voters themselves. See Kitrosser, supra note 13 (noting that, from the perspective of an objective-intent
inquiry, “[a] presidential action that is taken to appeal to a constituency’s perceived bigotry is no less
discriminatory in purpose than is an action that manifests the president’s personal biases”); see also
Huq, supra note 13, at 46 (noting that “it is passing odd to reject evidence on the ground that
candidates should not be understood to mean what they say prior to an election: It might instead be
more compatible with the democratic commitments of the Constitution to make precisely the
opposite assumption as a way of taking seriously the electoral structures created in Articles I and II”).
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it comes to post-campaign statements by elected officials, they should be
willing and able to do the same when it comes to statements that are made
during campaigns.81
What is more, the puffery objection overlooks the role that campaign
communications might have in shaping the subjective motives of public
officials after the fact.82 Consider, for instance, the making of campaign
promises: If Candidate A repeatedly assures voters that she will take measures
designed to marginalize a religious group, then Candidate A—through the
very act of offering that assurance—has created a political need for herself to
deliver on the promise once in office. In other words, even if Candidate A lacks
a personal, subjective desire to discriminate on the basis of religion,
Candidate A may well develop a subsequent, subjective desire to show her
constituency that her campaigning amounted to more than just empty talk.
The rhetoric may have been disingenuous at the moment it left a candidate’s
mouth, but once the rhetoric was uttered, it created a reality in which the
candidate needed to follow through on it.83 And, from the perspective of the
results-based or justification-based rationale, that should be enough. A
statement of this sort may not evince a “subjective motive” in the sense of
revealing what a candidate truly, deeply believes in that candidate’s heart of
hearts. But it still reveals a reason why a candidate may desire to put a policy
into place—a reason that can in turn reinforce constitutional concerns about
both the policy’s negative real-world effects and the pretextual nature of any
justifications that the government has offered on the policy’s behalf.84

81
82

83

84

Cf. Fields, supra note 13, at 300–01 (noting that the puffery objection “articulates a concern that is
a matter of degrees rather than absolutes, of evidentiary weight rather than admissibility”).
See Hasen, supra note 13 (noting that “[c]andidates tend to keep their promises,” and that “[i]f voters
can rely on discriminatory statements in deciding who to vote for, so should those who later
challenge the discrimination that flows after the season of campaign promises”). See generally JEFF
FISHEL, PRESIDENTS & PROMISES: FROM CAMPAIGN PLEDGE TO PRESIDENTIAL PERFORMANCE
(1985) (providing evidence, based on a close study of presidential campaigns from 1960 through
1980, that presidential candidates strive to keep their campaign-related promises).
To take a recent example, Paul Ryan recently cited Republicans’ repeated promise to “repeal and
replace” the Affordable Care Act as a reason for their ongoing efforts to do the same after the
election. See Paul Ryan, Keeping Our Promise to Repeal ObamaCare, WALL ST. J. OP. (Mar. 22 2017,
6:39
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/keeping-our-promise-to-repeal-obamacare1490222397. Ryan himself may well have had his own personal reasons for supporting the repeal,
but other members of Congress likely supported the repeal precisely because of their prior promise
to pursue it.
See Clarke, supra note 13, at 48.
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C. Other Motives
On the rules-based rationale for motives analysis, bad motives matter
because they violate some “rule” or “principle” that binds a reviewing court.
That rule/principle might derive from considerations of constitutional text,
history, or structure, or from a more philosophically-oriented account of the
values underlying the relevant constitutional provision. But regardless of the
source or content of the rule being applied, the critical, shared feature of
these arguments is their ability to justify the invalidation of badly-motivated
action by reference to the rule standing on its own. A motive counts as bad
simply because the rule says it is bad.
On a rule-based approach to motive analysis, the probative value of
campaign communications will depend on the particular rule being applied.
If, for instance, a rule directs attention to the objectively apparent motives
underlying government action, then—for reasons we have already
identified—campaign communications should carry some evidentiary value.
The same point holds for the application of rules that call for an inquiry into
the actual, subjective motives underlying government action: Here too, as we
have already suggested, campaign communications can usefully inform the
motive-based inquiry. But a governing rule might also define the disfavored
motive in more contingent or particularized terms, in which case campaign
communications may not have an evidentiary role to play.
I cannot rule out this possibility: It is possible as a conceptual matter to
formulate a rule that defines proscribed motives in a manner that renders
campaign communications irrelevant to the inquiry. Consider, for example,
a rule that declares: “The Equal Protection Clause requires courts to strictly
scrutinize legislation motivated by a racially discriminatory intent, but only
insofar as that intent is manifested in formal legislative proceedings.” I am
not aware of any existing doctrinal rules that work this way, but perhaps such
a rule would follow from some as-yet undiscovered nugget of constitutional
history, some as-yet unnoticed pattern within the constitutional text, some
as-yet unembraced philosophical insight regarding the wrongfulness of
discriminatory action, or some other development we cannot now foresee.
And if it did, there would arise along with it ipso facto reason for ignoring
campaign communications while assessing government motive.
Having said that, I do want to consider one potential “rule-based”
argument that might have the effect of rendering campaign communications
irrelevant to a wide range of motive-based inquiries. The argument—which
surfaced at points during the travel ban litigation85—would go something like
85

Brief for Appellants at 50, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. Mar.
24, 2017) (No. 17-1351) (“The problem with campaign statements is not that they may be forgotten,
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this: The Constitution, concerned as it is with state action, has nothing to say
about what governmental officials may or may not do in their unofficial
capacities.86 Thus, the argument goes, insofar as courts screen for badlymotivated action, this basic structural feature of constitutional law requires
that the inquiry extend no further than the “official motives” of government
actors. The argument would thus posit a key distinction between official and
unofficial conduct, and it would derive from that distinction the rule that only
“officially” proclaimed motives should bear on a law’s constitutionality.
Given that public officials make campaign statements in their unofficial
capacity, such statements would, by definition, fail to shed light on the
government’s official reasons for acting.87
The trouble with this argument lies not in the structural principle it
posits—certainly, one can contend that the Constitution applies to only the
“official” actions of governmental agents and entities. Rather, the trouble
lies in its conflation of substantive postulates about what the Constitution
prohibits with evidentiary postulates about how prohibited conduct may be
shown. The “state action” principle gives us good reason to reject
constitutional challenges predicated on actions that candidates took with
respect to their own “unofficial” campaigns. (Troubling as it may have been
for Donald Trump to exclude certain media outlets from his campaign
rallies,88 the state-action requirement would likely defeat any claim that the

86
87

88

but that they do not prove anything about the official objective underlying subsequent action.”); see
also Kontorovich, supra note 13 (“More broadly, constitutional structure supports examining only
executive statements to interpret executive action. When Trump made his most controversial
statements, he was [a] private citizen. He had not sworn to uphold the Constitution, or to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed. He was, in this sense, a legally differently obligated person.”).
The Court itself has used the phrase “official objective,” but in context, its use of the term seems to
align more closely with the idea of an authoritative finding of motive rather than a motive that derives
from official government proclamations. See McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 862–63 (2005).
The notable exception, of course, is the Thirteenth Amendment.
A related argument, advanced in the context of the travel-ban litigation, holds that the Oath of
Office, combined with the Article II duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” renders
pre-inauguration statements inherently irrelevant to the motives underlying post-inauguration
actions. See, e.g., Kontorivch, supra note 13. But this argument would seem to prove too much: if
the Oath and take-care duty were as transformative as the argument posits them to be, then courts
would have no reason to question the legality of anything an oath-taking President does. But, of
course, courts routinely entertain the possibility that a President might violate the Oath by acting
unlawfully; and if that is the relevant question, there is no immediately apparent reason why the
Oath itself requires confining the evidentiary record to statements made after the Oath’s
administration. It seems strange to concede, on the one hand, that the Oath does not guarantee
the lawfulness of all presidential action, while insisting at the same time that the oath wipes away
all the bad motives that a new President might have harbored in the not-too-distant past.
See Hadas Gold, Trump Campaign Ends Media Blacklist, POLITICO (Sept. 7, 2016, 10:01 AM),
http://www.politico.com/blogs/on-media/2016/09/trump-campaign-ends-media-blacklist227827 (noting that “[t]he blacklist ha[d] been in effect at the Trump campaign for nearly a year”).
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exclusion violated the First Amendment.89) But it hardly follows that, once
the state has acted, courts must ignore unofficial statements when
investigating the reasons why the official action itself occurred. Just because
I am acting in my unofficial capacity does not mean that I am unable to
propose, describe, explain, and/or justify things I plan to do in my official
capacity; indeed, candidates for public office spend much of their time doing
just that. And when I subsequently do the things I previously described, my
earlier (unofficial) statements remain relevant to the question of why I chose
to do what I (officially) did. Citing to “unofficial” statements in this sort of
way is no more controversial from a state-action perspective than, say, citing
to an “unofficial” academic study for purposes of bolstering a conclusion
about a law’s regulatory effects, citing to “unofficial” testimony for purposes
of illustrating the existence of a regulatory need, or even citing to an
“unofficial” law review article for purposes of supporting a legal claim of
relevance to a case under review. Just because the evidence itself comes from
an “unofficial” source in no way undermines its ability to shed light on the
legality of what was officially done.
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF INCLUSION
Even if campaign communications have evidentiary value, courts might
still worry about the regulatory consequences of the inclusionary approach.
The law of evidence is replete with rules that require the exclusion of
potentially probative information, and many of these rules are justified by
reference to concerns about the regulatory effects of letting that information
in. Various common law “privileges” make sense along these lines—a
client’s communication with her attorney may be decisively probative of a
key factual question, but revealing that communication to a jury would
undermine the relationship of trust between attorneys and clients.90 Public
law rules of “executive privilege” have been justified along similar lines.91
And, of course, the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule is often defended
as necessary as to achieve the consequence of deterring unlawful government

89

90

91

See Colleen Shalby, Has Trump Violated the 1st Amendment? Not Yet, L.A. TIMES (July 14, 2016, 7:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-reporter-ban-first-amendment-20160714-snaphtmlstory.html (quoting Prof. Michael Shapiro as noting that “[c]andidates are not subject to the 1st
Amendment even though their candidacies are part of the fabric of government” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (noting that “the purpose of [attorneyclient] privilege” is “‘to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys’” (quoting Fisher
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976))).
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (“Human experience teaches that those who
expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for
appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process.”).

366

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:2

behavior, even where the excluded evidence might help to demonstrate that
a defendant committed a crime.92
A similar argument might justify the exclusion of campaign
communications from motive-related inquiries. In this Part, I consider three
types of consequences about which opponents of the inclusionary approach
might worry. First are campaign-related consequences; more specifically, the
inclusionary approach might function to “chill” candidates’ communications
on the campaign trail. Second are governing-related consequences; more
specifically, the inclusionary approach might render valuable policies
vulnerable to invalidation on motive-related grounds. Finally, there are courtrelated consequences; more specifically, the inclusionary approach might give
judges too much room to engage in manipulative and unpredictable
decision-making.
A. Effects on Campaigning
Let’s begin with the most straightforward consequentialist objection to
the use of campaign communications as evidence of bad motives. If
candidates’ statements can affect the constitutionality of their subsequent
actions, then candidates will become more cautious about what they say
when they campaign. Rather than openly broadcast controversial policies
and ideas, candidates will simply hide the ball—disingenuously pretending
to support policies for reasons that they don’t actually believe, or not saying
anything about those policies at all. The result is a less robust political
dialogue and deprived information base for voters to consult when making
their electoral choices. Indeed, such chilling effects may even carry the
undesirable result of rendering voters’ democratic choices less responsive to
the true aims and intentions of candidates for public office.93
An initial difficulty with this argument lies in its prediction that
campaign-cognizant motives analysis would in fact have a substantial effect
on what is said and done on the campaign trail. At the margin, perhaps, a
candidate who is otherwise indifferent to the prospect of broadcasting bad
motives may regard hypothetical litigation difficulties as a decisive reason to
keep those motives bottled up. But a candidate’s top priority is usually to win
92

93

See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (characterizing the exclusionary rule as “a
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect”).
For general versions of this critique, see, for example, Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th
Cir. 1995) (declining to consider an elected prosecutor’s previous campaign statements on the
ground that doing so would “chill political debate during campaigns for prosecutor”). See also Int’l
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 650 (4th Cir. 2017) (Neimeyer, J., dissenting);
Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting); Kontorovich,
supra note 13.
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the election,94 and that present-day imperative will typically take precedence
over the highly secondary priority of avoiding future complications in court.95
This seems especially true with respect to candidates for the legislature and
other multi-member institutions, who might regard their own statements as
unlikely to be decisive in a court’s assessment of the institution’s own reasons
for acting. If a candidate sees political value in making some statement, then
the down-the-road prospect of litigation difficulties is unlikely to make the
candidate change course.96 Rather, the candidate will opt for the immediate
electoral gain and figure out sometime later how to deal with eventual
constitutional difficulties if and when they arise. This is, to be clear, just a
supposition, and perhaps empirical data would prove it wrong. But my
intuition is that the openness and robustness of political campaigns will not
much change if courts were to openly adopt the inclusionary approach.
But suppose that I am wrong and that an inclusionary approach would
in fact meaningfully deter political candidates from saying things that might
one day be used to support an inference of improper motives. Does that fact
alone provide a sufficient reason to reject it? Certainly, the chilling effects
argument is correct to posit a “cost” in the way of First Amendment freespeech values;97 if the only relevant goal is to foster a truly unfettered, noholds-barred political campaign, then any deterrent on campaign-related
communications would provide definitive cause for concern. But the Free
Speech Clause does not exhaust the entire range of constitutional values at
play, and tradeoffs start to come into view when these other values are
94

95

96

97

The “chilling effects” objection in this sense stands in some tension with the “mere puffery” argument
we earlier considered. See supra Section II.B. That argument, recall, posited that campaign
communications are useless indicators of future government action, reflecting instead meaningless
efforts at pandering. But if such motive-revealing statements constitute meaningless puffery, the First
Amendment case for preserving those statements becomes correspondingly less strong.
The degree of the candidate’s relative apathy towards future litigation may be amplified by the welldocumented behavioral tendency to discount future costs. See, e.g., David A. Dana, A Behavioral
Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1324–27 (2003) (noting that “[a]
substantial experimental literature suggests that people value the avoidance of immediate or nearly
immediate losses far more strongly than the avoidance of losses even in the not-too-distant future”).
See Clarke, supra note 13, at 69 (noting that politicians who “rise to prominence by eschewing
‘political correctness’ and making overtly racist and sexist campaign promises” are “unlikely to be
deterred by the prospect of litigation”).
To be clear, in raising this possibility, I do not mean to suggest that campaign-cognizant motives
review might violate the First Amendment itself. That possibility strikes me as unlikely, given the
absence of any sort of “official sanction” or “punishment” that the inclusionary approach entails.
See Kitrosser, supra note 13 (noting that “[w]eighing such [campaign] statements as evidence . . . is
not the same thing as punishing candidates for the statements themselves”); see also Michael Coenen,
Of Speech and Sanctions: Towards a Penalty-Sensitive Approach to the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
991, 994, 1018–19 (2012) (considering the relationship between penalty severity and the scope of
the free speech right). But even if First Amendment doctrine permits the inclusionary approach, we
can still consider the question whether First Amendment values might militate against judicial
reliance on that approach.
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considered. The relevant question, after all, is not whether a reduction in
political candidates’ expressive freedom represents a free speech-related cost;
rather, it is whether those costs are significant enough to outweigh whatever
constitutional benefits that the inclusionary approach would confer.
Consider, for instance, the possibility that a candidate, fearing future
constitutional troubles, declines to defend a policy proposal by reference to a
harmful racial stereotype. From a purely “free speech”-focused perspective,
the candidate’s self-censorship represents a constitutional “loss”: the
candidate would have expressed himself more freely but for the courts’
willingness to consider campaign communications as evidence of improper
motive. But from an equal protection perspective, the candidate’s selfcensorship represents a plausible constitutional “gain.” The candidate has
declined to validate a set of constitutionally-suspect motives and beliefs and,
thus by extension, has helped to minimize future public suspicions that those
motives and beliefs are impermissibly influencing official government
policy.98 Or consider, conversely, the possibility that a candidate, knowing
full well that courts must ignore what he says while campaigning, openly
espouses racist views and openly assures his supporters that he will, if elected,
promote the ideology of white supremacy. And suppose the candidate
thereupon assumes office and begins implementing facially-neutral policies
with racially discriminatory effects. The campaign statements make it
abundantly clear that the official is pursuing an intentionally discriminatory
goal, but the strict evidentiary prohibition renders courts powerless to
acknowledge that reality. Here too, free-speech values and equal-protection
values collide: The “benefit” of a robust and freewheeling campaign comes
at the expense of racially discriminatory action that courts can do nothing
about.
How one reconciles these tradeoffs depends on the relative weights one
places on free-speech values and the competing, constitutional values that
motive-based requirements can bring into play. Perhaps, as a matter of first
principles, free-speech values are so much more important and so much
more absolute that they must always take precedence across all doctrinal
contexts.99 I cannot definitively refute that argument here,100 but there is an
98

99
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See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d at 600 (“To the extent that our review chills
campaign promises to condemn and exclude entire religious groups, we think that a welcome
restraint.”).
Even here, complications would arise insofar as a challenger pointed to campaign-communications
to support a First Amendment claim, at which point, one set of free-speech values (say, the value of
free, unfettered debate) would be pitted directly against another (say, the value of avoiding
governmental action that appears to punish the espousal of unpopular beliefs).
For a more extended exploration into the means by which courts might attempt to gauge the
relative “importance” of legal rights (including, but not limited to constitutional rights), see Michael
Coenen, Constitutional Privileging, 99 VA. L. REV. 683, 732–34 (2013).
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important sense in which it ends up proving too much. Motive-based rules—
even with campaign communications fully excluded from judicial purview—
will always produce caution and self-censorship on the part of individuals
holding office.101 The “discriminatory intent” requirement of the Equal
Protection Clause may affect what a governor says at a bill-signing ceremony;
the motive-based elements of dormant Commerce Clause may affect what a
state legislator says in a press release; the “purpose” prong of the Lemon test
may affect what an administrator says in a television interview; and so forth.
Again, from one perspective, this result might seem like a good thing: motiverevealing rhetoric of this sort can be characterized as constitutionally bad
and its minimization as constitutionally good. But whether the result is good
or bad, my point here is simply that the result obtains. As long as motives
matter in constitutional law, public officials will have reason to avoid
injecting certain types of arguments and justifications into public debate.
The chilling effects don’t just melt away when the campaign ends.102
Consequently, if free-speech concerns turn out to be powerful enough to
require an exclusionary approach to communications made during a
campaign, they would also seem to require an exclusionary approach to any
motive-revealing communications made at any time in any form. As long as
motives matter, aspiring and actual public officials will sometimes have to
moderate what they say.
B. Effects on Governing
A second objection to the inclusionary approach would point to
consequences arising after the campaign has concluded. If government
officials have broadcast bad motives when campaigning for office, the
inclusionary approach might sometimes help to demonstrate that suspect
motives lurk beneath those officials’ subsequent actions. And in so doing, the
approach will increase the likelihood of those subsequent actions being struck
down. Where deferential review would normally apply, searching judicial
review will instead apply—all because of what a public official said back when
that official was running for office. This would amount to, in some judges’

101

102

See Somin, supra note 13 (“Any inquiry into the discriminatory motives of government officials might
potentially chill their speech, because speech indicating a discriminatory motivation is inevitably
going to be relevant evidence in such a case.”).
Indeed, a former candidate would now have even less reason to discount the risk of subsequent
judicial invalidation. The post-campaign risk of constitutional trouble would be higher because: (a)
post-campaign statements will have a closer temporal proximity to the official governmental action;
and (b) the candidate would now actually hold the office rather than simply have a chance of doing
so. In other words, what once was the risk that something said might eventually cause constitutional
trouble in the event that the candidate won election would now become the (higher) risk that
something said might more immediately cause constitutional trouble, period.
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views, “an absurd result—namely, that the policies of an elected official can
be forever held hostage by the unguarded declarations of a candidate.”103
Call this the “constrained governance” concern; it stems from worries that a
former candidate will have a hard time implementing government policy if
courts can pay attention to what that candidate said in the past.
There are two ways of interpreting the “constrained governance”
complaint. First, the complaint may simply state an equitable concern about
the unfairness of “punishing” a former candidate for things that were said
during a campaign. If this is the relevant concern, then color me
unsympathetic. Campaign-cognizant motives analysis may well create a
problem for former political candidates who now assume the burden of
governing. But if an official himself really did signal bad motives during the
course of a campaign, the problem is one of the official’s own making. To
take the most obvious example, no one forced Donald Trump to demonize
the world’s second-largest religious group when he sought the Presidency.
Instead, Trump himself chose to make anti-Muslim sentiment a pillar of his
campaign, calculating—quite possibly correctly—that doing so would
redound to his political benefit. But whatever the political expedience of this
maneuver, it had the foreseeable consequence of casting now-President
Trump’s immigration policy in a troubling constitutional light. Pitying
Trump and blaming the courts for that state of affairs seems to me to get
things backwards. Trump was the one that repeatedly defended his
immigration priorities in religion-charged terms, and the courts were the
ones who had to grapple with the constitutional difficulties that his own
rhetoric created.
But even if we set aside concerns about the fair treatment of candidatespeakers, there is a separate version of the “constrained governance”
complaint that we need to consider. The concern here is that judicial
scrutiny of campaign communications will sometimes result in the
invalidation of laws that—from a purely consequentialist standpoint—really
ought to be in place. For example, counterterrorism needs may sometimes
necessitate the adoption of rules that have a disparate impact on some
Muslim-majority countries.
But if the President’s own campaign
communications support an inference of anti-Muslim animus, then those
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Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also Int’l
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d at 650–51 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (worrying that an
inclusionary approach would “leave the President and his Administration in a clearly untenable
position for future action” given that “President Trump will need to engage in foreign policy
regarding majority-Muslim nations, including those designated by the Order”); Kontorovich, supra
note 13 (“This would mean that Trump is automatically disbarred, from the moment of his
inauguration, of exercising certain presidential powers, not because of his actions as president, but
because of who he is—that is, how he won the presidency.”).
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same policies will always be vulnerable to judicial invalidation, even where
those policies have valid, security-promoting effects. And one can imagine
other variations on the theme. A candidate’s past appeal to racial stereotypes
might frustrate a state’s present-day ability to foster valuable student diversity
at its educational institutions.104 A candidate’s past embrace of the goal of
impeding access to abortions might frustrate a state’s ability to implement
valid health and safety measures related to the licensing of abortion
providers.105 A candidate’s expressed desire to silence an opposing viewpoint
might frustrate the state’s ability to implement any number of sensible “time,
place, manner” restrictions on speech.106 In short, the inclusionary approach
could end up prohibiting former candidates from pursuing a variety of
legitimate or even compelling regulatory ends.
This objection states a valid concern, but the concern is over- and
underinclusive in relation to the conclusion it prescribes. As to the problem
of underinclusiveness, the “constrained governance” objection, like the
“chilling effects” objection, implicates all forms of government-motives
analysis, not just campaign-cognizant motives analysis in particular. Any
area of doctrine that calls for a consideration of government motives gives
rise to the possibility that certain statements or actions by government
officials will render their policies vulnerable to judicial invalidation; that
possibility becomes no less acute when the relevant statements and actions
postdate an official’s elevation to office. Indeed, taken to its logical extreme,
the “constrained governance” objection simply collapses into a prescription
for majoritarian judicial review.107 That prescription may or may not have
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Of course, a race-conscious admissions program would already trigger strict scrutiny, so the motiverevealing statements would have no effect on the level of scrutiny being applied. See generally Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny to a race-conscious admissions program).
Even so, the revealed motives and/or beliefs might prompt a court to look more skeptically at the
government’s justification for the program when applying the strict scrutiny standard. See supra
Section I.C.
Here, campaign communications might be used to show that the restriction served the “purpose”
of creating a “substantial obstacle” to pre-viability abortions, even if it did not necessarily achieve
that purpose in effect. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (“An
undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”
(emphasis added)).
The campaign communication in this example might suffice to demonstrate that the speechinfringing aspects of a law were in fact “related to the suppression of free expression,” in which case
a “more demanding standard” of scrutiny would apply. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403–04
(1989); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (noting that, “in determining
content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular,” the
“government’s purpose is the controlling consideration”).
After all, and as I have suggested elsewhere, many constitutional constraints on government will have
the effect of making it more difficult for governments to govern. That is just a baseline feature of a
system that involves judicially enforceable constitutional limits. See Coenen, supra note 59, at 53–56.
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merit, but it ought at least be stated as such.
As to overinclusiveness, the “constrained governance” objection posits an
unpersuasive case for a total abandonment of the field. The objection may
suffice to show why courts should never treat the badly-motivated nature of
a law as a ground for automatic invalidation. But it states a less persuasive
case against merely raising the justificatory hurdle that badly-motivated
actions must clear. One can apply a strong judicial presumption against
badly-motivated action while still permitting the government to act in the
face of a sufficiently strong regulatory need. That, indeed, is what many
existing areas of doctrine purport to do,108 and it reflects one attempt to
reconcile the real constitutional problems that bad motives create with the
real-world demands that government actors must face. The point, to be
clear, is not that existing doctrine strikes precisely the right balance between
these competing concerns, or even that striking the right balance is
conceptually easy to do.109 Rather, the point is simply that the balance can
at least be attempted: One does not need to “choose” between the polar
extremes of caring exclusively about bad motives, on the one hand, and of
deferring reflexively to the government, on the other. Intermediate solutions
can and do exist.
What is more, even if an existing form of motive analysis might prevent
the government from pursuing what it regards to be necessary regulatory
action, the government can itself alter the backdrop against which this
analysis proceeds. This is especially true where the relevant motives are
apparent rather than actual. Social perceptions are fluid and malleable, and if
the government wishes to “change the narrative” about a given law or policy,
it certainly has the wherewithal to do so. Some critics of the inclusionary
approach have insisted that candidates who broadcast bad motives on the
campaign will forever be “stuck” with those same bad motives going
forward.110 But why should that be so? There is nothing external to the
President that prevents him from disavowing his previous “Muslim ban” and
expressing regret at having previously appealed to anti-Islamic prejudices.
And if such an about-face proves to be sufficiently public, enduring, and
sincere, then the “social meaning” of the President’s immigration policy can
in fact change and, along with it, the constitutional implications of the policy
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See Fallon, supra note 67, at 1309–11 (explaining how some policies have survived strict scrutiny).
For example, Ashutosh Bhagwat has criticized the strict scrutiny test on the ground that its relatively
“ad hoc” nature has “tended to weaken individual rights.” Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the
(D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30 CONN. L. REV. 961, 962 (1998).
See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“If a
court were to find that campaign skeletons prevented an official from pursuing otherwise
constitutional policies, what could he do to cure the defect? Could he stand up and recant it all
(‘just kidding!’) and try again?”).
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itself.111
All of this may seem far-fetched,112 but I believe its underlying
constitutional logic is sound. Whenever constitutional law draws a
distinction between badly-motivated and innocently-motivated government
action, courts must make some inquiry into the reasons for which the
government acted. Those reasons can be evinced by a variety of different
materials, including, but not limited to, statements that government officials
issued while running for office. But just as campaign communications can
showcase bad motives, so too can post-campaign communications showcase
innocent motives. And the latter statements, if weighty enough, should alter
the motive-based calculus, by revealing that government officials appear to
endorse—or in fact do endorse—policies for reasons that are different from
ones that they embraced during the campaign. That the structure of this
inquiry might sometimes induce government officials to “change their tune”
strikes me as a feature rather than a bug of motive-sensitive doctrinal analysis.
If we care about government motives (and especially about apparent
government motives), rules that encourage officials openly to abandon
wrongful purposes create exactly the set of incentives that the doctrine ought
to strive for.
C. Effects on Judging
A final, consequence-based objection to campaign-cognizant motives
review points to disruptive effects within judicial doctrine itself. The
inclusionary approach, by definition, widens the evidentiary domain within
which motives analysis proceeds. The higher the number of statements and
communications that courts can consider, the more unbounded the inquiry
becomes. That open-endedness, in turn, can render legal conclusions about
motive more difficult to predict and easier to manipulate in the service of
extralegal goals. Viewed from this perspective, a bright-line, exclusionary
approach to campaign communications may be seen as a welcome means of
circumscribing a form of judicial analysis that might otherwise spin out of
control.
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Cf. Joseph Blocher, Out, Damned Spot: What Cure for Unconstitutional Animus?, TAKE CARE (May 31,
2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/out-damned-spot-what-cure-for-unconstitutional-animus
(considering the problem of how courts might determine whether government statements suffice to
“remove the taint” of an impermissible purpose, and suggesting that while “[i]t is not easy to
articulate a single, trans-substantive test for curing unconstitutional intent. . . . [D]escribing a cure
is not radically different from that of diagnosis, which the Court has done in a variety of contexts”);
see also Coenen, supra note 5, at 1769 (noting that “the potential for fruitful dialogue [is] driven by
motive-based rules”).
I concede that it is far-fetched to imagine President Trump disavowing his previous statements
about Islam, but that is an altogether separate issue.
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In endorsing an exclusionary approach, one lower court judge recently
gave voice to this very concern:
[C]ampaign statements are unbounded resources by which to find intent of
various kinds. They are often short-hand for larger ideas; they are explained,
modified, retracted, and amplified as they are repeated and as new
circumstances and arguments arise. And they are often ambiguous. A court
applying the majority’s new rule could thus have free rei[n] to select
whichever expression of a candidate’s developing ideas best supports its
desired conclusion.113

The concern, moreover, goes beyond the problem of doctrinal uncertainty.
Left free to rummage through campaign materials, the argument goes,
judges will start to develop even bolder ideas: “If a court, dredging through
the myriad remarks of a campaign, fails to find material to produce the
desired outcome, what stops it from probing deeper to find statements from
a previous campaign, or from a previous business conference, or from
college?”114 The exclusionary approach, so the argument goes, would stop
such shenanigans dead in their tracks.115
Like any objection grounded in concerns about open-endedness and
unpredictability, this argument implicates the familiar “rules/standards”
tradeoff. All else equal, the exclusionary approach (which regards campaign
communications as categorically irrelevant) prescribes a form of motives
analysis that is more rule-like than the inclusionary approach (which regards
campaign communications as potentially relevant).116 The former, unlike the
latter, places a large body of potentially probative evidence out of bounds,
thus obviating the need to make difficult judgment calls about the meaning
of certain statements, their connection to a challenged law, the comparative
weight to accord them, and so forth. But, as is often true with bright-line
rules, the gains in simplicity and straightforwardness come at the expense of
113
114

115
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Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 650 (4th Cir. 2017) (Niemeyer, J.,
dissenting).
Id.; see also Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1173 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“And why stop with the
campaign? Personal histories, public and private, can become a scavenger hunt for statements that
a clever lawyer can characterize as proof of a -phobia or an -ism, with the prefix depending on the
constitutional challenge of the day.”).
See Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1174 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“Limiting the evidentiary
universe to activities undertaken while crafting an official policy makes for a manageable, sensible
inquiry. But the panel has approved open season on anything a politician or his staff may have
said, so long as a lawyer can argue with a straight face that it signals an unsavory motive.”).
It is perhaps worth noting that the inclusionary approach may in some cases simplify the judicial
inquiry. Suppose, in particular, that the relevant “official” proclamations, statements, etc., are
ambiguous as to the existence of a suspect motive, and suppose further that the relevant campaignrelated communications are relentlessly and unambiguously revealing of that suspect motive. In
this scenario, the exclusionary approach leaves judges charged with the difficult task of parsing and
interpreting the ambiguous official statements, whereas the inclusionary approach makes it easy for
judges to resolve the ambiguities. Sometimes, in other words, broadening the evidentiary pool will
have the beneficial effect of generating clarity where confusion would otherwise have prevailed.
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accuracy, nuance, and context-sensitivity.117 And that is so because, as I have
already argued, campaign communications can sometimes provide useful,
relevant information about the government’s reasons for acting. How one
responds to this tradeoff depends in part on one’s relative affinities towards
rules and standards. But in my view, the simplicity-related benefits of the
exclusionary approach are not significant enough to justify its accuracyrelated costs.
Three observations might bolster this conclusion, even for those who
place a higher premium on the value of bright-line rules. First, under some
circumstances, the inclusionary approach will actually prove more clarityenhancing than its exclusionary counterpart. Where the record reveals little
information (or mixed information) about post-election government motives,
the exclusionary approach will present a difficult, motive-related inquiry.
But where pre-election communications make the motive abundantly clear,
the inclusionary approach will greatly simplify the inquiry. An expanded
universe of relevant evidence, in other words, does not always yield a more
complex and indeterminate evidentiary inquiry. Where the evidentiary
universe is expanded to encompass highly probative information, what was
once a difficult and unbounded investigation into government motive will
become simple and straightforward instead.
Second, and relatedly, an exclusionary approach to campaign
communications may not provide as much of a bright-line sorting
mechanism as first meets the eye. Under some circumstances, the distinction
between “campaign-related” and “campaign-unrelated” communications
may turn out to be straightforward, but in other circumstances, one can
imagine various threshold difficulties raised by the distinction itself. This
seems especially so with respect to incumbents running for re-election—
officials, that is, who are simultaneously campaigning and governing during
the same time period. When it comes to these officials, what sorts of
statements should the exclusionary approach exclude? Certainly statements
made at campaign rallies and fundraisers. But what about statements made
at a press conference before the rally? Statements uttered during a cable
news interview? Statements posted to the individual’s unofficial (and/or
official) Twitter feed? Statements made at “official” events that had an
evident, campaign-related purpose? Given the frequent blending of
governing and politicking, incumbents’ actions will sometimes be difficult to
place on one side or the other of the “campaign-related” line. Under an
inclusionary approach, however, this particular difficulty goes away; the
absence of a threshold bar on campaign-communications obviates the need
to tag such communications as campaign-related or campaign-unrelated in
the first place.
117

See Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 644, 652 n.19 (2014).
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Finally, the simplicity-based critique of the inclusionary approach likely
understates the potential for subsequent clarifying guidance. Openstandards can be “rulified” over time,118 and it is easy to imagine the
emergence of various rule-like restrictions on the application of campaigncognizant motives review. For example, the doctrine might prohibit reliance
on statements by surrogates, thus restricting the evidentiary domain to only
those words that were uttered by candidates themselves. The doctrine might
impose temporal restrictions on the use of campaign communications,
permitting reliance, for instance, on only those statements and
communications that were uttered during the candidate’s most recent run
for office. The doctrine might develop a more nuanced set of rules regarding
the strength of the connection between motive-revealing communications and the
policies that they might inform—requiring, for instance, that an actual
government policy constitute a “direct outgrowth” of a campaign proposal
that was defended in constitutionally suspect terms.119 I raise these
possibilities not for the purpose of endorsing them; some may be undesirable
on their own terms and others may not provide much in the way of
constraining “rulification.” But they at least serve to highlight the possibility
of citing to campaign communications within a framework that is at least
somewhat structured and constraining.
One final point bears mentioning here, as applied to the particular
concern about judicial manipulation and abuse. At the margins, it may be
true that the inclusionary approach gives judges more leeway to manipulate
doctrine than does its exclusionary counterpart. But I doubt the difference
is great. Judging governmental purpose is an inherently discretionary
endeavor, requiring difficult (and to some extent ineffable) judgments
involving abstractions like “intentions,” “mental states,” “social meanings,”
and so forth.120 The abstractness of the concepts themselves will always
create room for opportunistic and manipulative judging; that risk, I think, is
simply baked in to the business of considering government motives in the first
place. Motive-based rules are in this sense no different from any number of
other rules within constitutional law that create openings for bad-faith
118
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See id. at 653–58; see also Mark D. Rosen, Modeling Constitutional Doctrine, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691,
696 (2005) (noting that open-ended standards “almost always become[ ] increasingly rule-like” as
they are applied over time).
Cf. Somin, supra note 13 (emphasizing that President Trump’s travel plan was a “direct outgrowth
of a major theme” of his campaign).
And that is to say nothing of any number of other tasks that judges routinely take on, such as
defining the relevant “field” that a law regulates for purposes of preemption analysis, asking whether
a particular government interest qualifies as “compelling” for purposes of applying strict scrutiny,
or consulting historical sources (including, not incidentally, the campaign-centered Federalist
Papers) in an effort to discern the “original public meaning” of the Constitution’s text. See Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1275,
1288 (2006) (“No one doubts . . . that constitutional law makes frequent use of standards, often
without anguish concerning their judicial manageability.”).
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mischief-making by the judges who apply them. They are there, and they
can be abused. But if we are willing to tolerate that risk when it comes to
evaluating government motives in the first place, then it seems to me that we
should be equally willing to tolerate the risk when it comes to defining the
evidentiary parameters of the inquiry. In both cases, the better guard against
abusive judicial conduct lies in the maintenance of professional standards
that promote honesty, impartiality, and good-faith behavior within the
judiciary itself—not in constructing largely arbitrary prophylactic rules
governing the sorts of evidence on which judges can and cannot rely.
CONCLUSION
The appeal of the exclusionary approach may stem from the commonly
shared idea that judging is—or at least ought to be—an apolitical exercise.
If we are serious about maintaining a wall between law and politics, the
argument goes, then we should eschew the inclusionary approach on the
ground that, by intermingling electoral politics with constitutional law, it
threatens to breach the divide. But it is also worth remembering that too much
separation between law and politics may itself be a bad thing, threatening to
render the doctrine unduly artificial, naïve, and unresponsive to peoples’
lived experiences in the real world. Judges can undoubtedly simplify and depoliticize the doctrine by refusing to consider anything and everything
“politics-related” when deciding constitutional cases. But at some point they
would be operating against the backdrop of an informational universe that
bears little resemblance to the one we actually inhabit. Some recognition of
political realities may therefore be necessary in order to ensure that
constitutional guarantees remain meaningful.
Of course, it is difficult to say where exactly judges should strike the
balance between the twin extremes of total political agnosticism and total
political awareness: Each extreme carries its own limitations and downside
risks. But as I hope to have shown, I believe that courts can reasonably
navigate these risks when evaluating and weighing motive-related
communications that are made during the course of a political campaign.
And I further believe that the exclusionary approach—which would shut
down any such investigation altogether—would end up distorting motivebased review in unproductive ways. That is not to say that courts should
exclusively consider campaign-related communications when identifying the
government’s reasons for acting; nor is it to say that the motive-revealing
significance of a campaign communication ought always to outweigh
anything that the government “officially” does. But I do think that such
communications can provide a useful piece of the evidentiary puzzle—one
that can be utilized without unduly compromising future campaigns, presentday governance, or the complexity of the doctrine at large. If the path to
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power runs through a political campaign, then courts ought to assess the
exercise of that power with the campaign itself in view.

